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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF SHARED MENTAL MODELS IN TEAM COORDINATION CREW
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SKILLS OF MUTUAL PERFORMANCE
MONITORING AND BACKUP BEHAVIORS
by Alan Reid Martinez
May 2015
The purpose of Crew Resource Management (CRM) is to improve flight crew
coordination in multipiloted cockpits and in turn increase aviation flight safety. One
aspect of CRM team coordination is the ability for flight crews to monitor each other
properly and provide the appropriate backup if necessary. The author explores the role of
shared mental models among Coast Guard rotary wing cockpit flight crews and their
influence on monitoring and backup behaviors during nighttime overwater flight
maneuvers. Using the Coast Guard’s MH-65 Operational Flight Trainer located at the
Coast Guard Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, cockpit flight crews flew
automated and manual instrument takeoff (ITO) maneuvers. Coast Guard CRM subject
matter experts observed the interaction of the cockpit flight crews judging the level of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers. Using
a repeated measures design, the researcher investigated the relationship and interaction
between ITO maneuver shared mental model, type of ITO maneuver, and pilot flight time
on cockpit flight crew monitoring and backup behaviors. Findings indicate a significant
relationship between cockpit automation and levels of mutual performance monitoring
and backup behaviors in cockpit flight crews.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Aviation is an essential operational capability of the U.S. Coast Guard for the
safety, security, and stewardship of U.S. maritime interests (U.S. Coast Guard, 2014b,
2014c). Coast Guard flight crews operate at Coast Guard Air Stations across the country
flying multi-mission aircraft supporting the missions of the Coast Guard. The primary
missions of Coast Guard flight crews is operational response to search and rescue, law
and treaties enforcement, marine environmental protection, and military readiness (U.S.
Coast Guard, 2013). However, Coast Guard aircraft accidents reduce operational
effectiveness, cost lives, and damage valuable equipment.
In 2010, the Coast Guard experienced five Class A flight mishaps resulting in loss
of lives and costing the organization $124,860,386 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). These
five Class A flight mishaps represented the highest annual Class A flight mishap cost
ever experienced by the Coast Guard (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). Coast Guard aviation
leaders responded by calling for a comprehensive safety review of all aspects of aviation
operations (M. Emerson, personal communication, July 28, 2010). The primary focus of
the review was identifying aviation operational deficiencies and possible areas for flight
safety improvement. One outcome of the safety review was the evaluation and refocus of
the Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for Coast Guard flight crews (U.S.
Coast Guard, 2010a). A few years earlier, then Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard
Aviation Training Center expressed concern to aviation program managers about the
current Coast Guard CRM program, believing that CRM training had become a mere
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“check in the box” for Coast Guard flight crews and called for a comprehensive training
upgrade (D. R. Callahan, personal communication, June 19, 2007).
Crew Resource Management (CRM)
According to Harris (2011), aviation is a sociotechnical system consisting of
complex interactions between humans and technology. Aviation CRM is a management
process encouraging the optimal use of human resources in today’s aircraft cockpits.
According to Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm (1999), CRM represents human
performance and its limitations in the cockpit. The U.S. Coast Guard (2014a) defines
CRM as “the effective use of all available resources for flight crews to assure a safe and
efficient operation, reducing error, avoiding stress, and increasing efficiency” (p. 20-3).
Aviation CRM attempts to combat human error among flight crews by training and
improving non-technical skills such as communication, coordination, and teamwork
(Flin, O’Conner, & Crichton, 2008; Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010; Wiener, Kanki, &
Helmreich, 1993). Beginning in the 1970s in response to several commercial airline
accidents exposing poor crew communication and coordination, CRM is now prevalent in
many high-risk, dynamic team environments and organizations (Fraher, 2011; Helmreich
et al., 1999). In aviation, the primary purpose of CRM is increasing flight safety by
improving teamwork effectiveness of flight crews (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009). Reason
(1997) argues that aviation CRM has proven successful in improving flight crew
performance through situational awareness sharing, enhanced leadership, and better crew
communication.
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CRM Training
The focus of CRM training is to prevent aviation accidents by improving and
optimizing individual and crew performance (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA],
2004; U.S. Coast Guard, 2014a). The FAA (2004) further defines CRM training
essentials and the role of flight crews with the following stated guidelines:
1. CRM training is most effective within a training program centered on
clear, comprehensive [Standard Operating Procedures] SOPs;
2. CRM training should focus on the functioning of crewmembers as
teams, not as a collection of technically competent individuals;
3. CRM training should instruct crewmembers how to behave in ways
that foster crew effectiveness;
4. CRM training should provide opportunities for crewmembers to
practice the skills necessary to be effective team leaders and team
members;
5. CRM training exercises should include all crewmembers functioning
in the same roles (e.g. captain, first officer, and/or flight engineer,
flight attendants) that they normally perform in flight;
6. CRM training should include effective team behaviors during normal
routine operations. (p. 6)
Human Error in the Cockpit
Aviation CRM training also focuses on improving cognitive and psychosocial
skills of flight crewmembers (Kanki et al., 2010), which primarily manifest through
teamwork processes (Wiener et al., 1993). Advocates of CRM believe that improving
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cockpit flight crews’ interpersonal and cognitive teamwork processes can directly
increase flight safety and reduce the number of accidents attributed to human error (FAA,
2004; Foushee, 1984; Lauber, 1987; Oser, Salas, Merket, Walwanis, & Bergondy, 2000).
In fact, reducing the accidents caused by human error is the major thrust of recent CRM
error management initiatives and human factors accident analyses (Helmreich & Merritt,
2000; Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001,
2003). Although new viewpoints now exist about the role of CRM training, reducing
cockpit human errors and aircraft accidents through CRM training remains a prevailing
view among human factor researchers and aviation safety experts today (Flin et al., 2008;
O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007; U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
However, others believe aircraft accidents are not caused by unreliable and
irresponsible flight crews committing errors but occur because complex systems are
basically unsafe and represent competing values in a resource-constrained world (Dekker,
2002, 2003; Perrow, 1999). Researchers now argue that human resilience, flexibility, and
adaptability create safety in complex systems (Cook, O’Conner, Render, & Woods, 2004;
Dekker, 2002, 2003, 2006; Reason, 2008). According to Reason (2008), the human
contribution of individual and collective mindfulness is required in complex and dynamic
environments where human and technical failures are unavoidable. Fraher (2011)
believes that teams operating in high-risk dynamic environments must evolve and adapt
to changing workplace conditions and further suggests that today’s advanced
technologies require teams with increased communication, improved coordination, and
shared mental modeling.

5
Shared Mental Models
Effective crew performance coordination requires shared mental models among
flight crewmembers (FAA, 2003), and research shows shared mental models enhance
crew coordination (Grote, Kolbe, Zala-Mezo, Bienefeld-Seall, & Kunzle, 2010; Krieger,
2005; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011). A positive relationship exists among shared mental
models, team processes, and performance (Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002;
Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, &
Salas, 2005; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Rentsch &
Klimoski, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005; Waller, Gupta, &
Giambatista, 2004; Zou & Lee, 2010). Teams operating in high-risk environments, such
as aircraft cockpits, must cultivate a shared mindfulness which ensures a proactive
approach to safety and sustained vigilance (Fraher, 2011; Krieger, 2005). Cockpit flight
crews align expectations and increase safety by using shared mental models tools such as
standardized phraseology, standardized operating procedures, and pre-established verbal
communication (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors
Shared mental models enhance team effectiveness by providing the underpinning
for mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors decisions (Salas, Rosen,
Burke, Goodwin, & Fiore, 2006). Through shared mental models, team members decide
if, when, and what type of monitoring and backup is appropriate and required.
Monitoring and backup behaviors are team coordination processes which increase the
awareness of other team members’ actions and cause members to pay attention and
recognize when appropriate corrections and feedback are necessary (Wilson, Salas,
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Priest, & Andrews, 2007). According to Sumwalt, Thomas, and Dismukes (2003), pilots
use monitoring and cross checking to increase flight safety. Since the goal of CRM
training in aircraft multipiloted cockpits is to increase flight safety by improving flight
crew coordination, Sumwalt et al. (2003) argue that monitoring and backup skills need to
be the next focus of aviation CRM training.
Pilot Monitoring and Cockpit Automation
Cockpit flight crews also use mental models when monitoring aircraft automation
and establish expectations of the behavior of those automation systems (Bjorklund,
Alfredson, & Dekker, 2006; Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997). However, researchers
believe that flight crew monitoring performance decreases when aircraft are controlled by
highly reliable cockpit automated systems such as autopilot, flight director system, and
flight management system (Mouloua, Hancock, Jones, & Vincenzi, 2010). Cockpit
automation is associated with poorer human-monitoring performance (Casner &
Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes &
Berman, 2010). According to Mouloua et al. (2010), cockpit automation impacts humanmonitoring performance and monitoring strategies based on flight crew shared mental
models (Mouloua et al., 2010).
Shared Mental Models in Coast Guard Aviation
Coast Guard aviation now recognizes the significance of shared mental models
among cockpit flight crews. Interim Change 5 of the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual
released in April of 2013 updates procedures associated with helicopter overwater ITOs
and specifically addresses the role of shared mental models with the following guidance:
“Following the completion of hover operations, the [pilot at the controls] shall give a
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departure brief prior to commencing a coupled or manual ITO to ensure a shared mental
model amongst all crewmembers” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p. 2-19). Interim Change 5
also defined pilot flying and safety pilot responsibilities during aircraft-automated
coupled ITOs and pilot flying manual ITOs. The goal of the updated procedures is to
increase cockpit flight crew effectiveness by establishing standard pilot flying actions and
safety pilot verbal calls and monitoring duties during both types of ITOs. However, the
value or influence of shared mental models in Coast Guard cockpits and their role in
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during cockpit automated and nonautomated critical flight phases is unclear.
Statement of the Problem
Coast Guard CRM training attempts to reduce human error and increase flight
safety by improving flight crew coordination. However, recent Coast Guard aircraft
mishaps costing lives and millions of dollars, coupled with the new views that human
resiliency, flexibility, adaptability, and shared mental models create safety by improving
flight crew coordination and performance, highlight the need for a clearer understanding
of the role of shared mental models and cockpit automation on mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors in Coast Guard cockpits.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or
manual), and cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors.

8
Research Objectives (RO)
The research objectives of the study are as follows:
RO1: Describe the demographics of the study population according to pilot
designation/qualification and cockpit flight crew total flight time experience.
RO2: Determine the level of mental model sharedness in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight
crews of ITO maneuver critical team tasks.
RO3: Determine the relationship between the ITO maneuver shared mental model score
and observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews.
RO4: Compare the type of ITO (coupled or manual) on observed levels of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight
crews.
RO5: Determine the relationship between flight crew total flight time and observed
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft
cockpit flight crews.
RO6: Determine the combined interaction effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental
model score, ITO type, and flight crew total flight time on observed levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit
flight crews.
Conceptual Framework
Figure 1 provides the conceptual framework for depicting the existence of cockpit
flight crew ITO shared mental model (RO2) and its relationship with mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors (RO3). The ITO type (coupled or manual) and cockpit
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crew total pilot time may also influence mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors (RO4 and RO5)
5). The combined interaction effect of the ITO shared mental
model, ITO type, and cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors is shown in RO6.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of the Study’s Research Objectives and Variables.
Variables
Data collection will consist of a Shared Mental Model Instrument
nstrument (RO1, RO2),
and a Monitoring/Backup Behaviors Instrument (RO3, RO4, RO5, RO6)
6) for observing
MH-65
65 aircraft cockpit flight crewmember behaviors during ITO maneuvers in the MH65D Operational Flight Trainer located at the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center
(ATC) in Mobile, Alabama
Alabama. A complete description of the instruments, data collection,
collection
and ITO maneuver scenario are found in the study’s methodology chapter.
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Significance of the Study
From a human capital standpoint, the selection, training, and proficiency of Coast
Guard pilots directly affects the success of Coast Guard aviation operational missions.
The ability of Coast Guard flight crew to operate in extreme and hazardous environments
in a highly professional and safe manner protects flight crews and saves lives.
The significance of the study is the expected applicability to other Coast Guard
rotary-wing and fixed wing aircraft cockpits beyond the MH-65. Though the aircraft
equipment and models may differ, cockpit flight crew procedures and protocol in Coast
Guard multipiloted aircraft is highly similar to that of other aircraft. Research insights
are immediately available and applicable to all Coast Guard cockpit flight crew. Military
CRM, specifically CRM in Coast Guard cockpits, have concentrated on skills identified
twenty years ago. To stay current, CRM in the Coast Guard must evolve as research
clarifies new aspects of cockpit flight crew coordination.
Assumptions
Because the MH-65 pilots participating in the study are attending their normal
recurrent training at ATC Mobile, it is assumed that they accurately represent the
population of duty-standing pilots assigned to Coast Guard Air Stations at the seventeen
operational units across the United States and Puerto Rico. A second assumption is that
participants taking part in the study are under no perceived pressure to participate and
will perform in a manner similar to their normal cockpit protocol and performance
abilities. Thirdly, the study participants are expected to answer the survey questions
truthfully and without bias. Finally, the researcher assumed the methods used for
determining crew pairing shared mental models found in early team process and
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performance literature are valid (Marks et al., 2000, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu
et al., 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005), and that the Monitoring/Backup Behaviors
Instrument aligns with methods found in Salas, Sims, & Burke (2005) and Wilson et al.
(2007).
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
The researcher was not involved in the selection of the pilots attending the ATC
Mobile training course, and therefore pilots may not truly represent the total MH-65 pilot
population. To narrow the scope of research, the study was limited to the MH-65 aircraft
community and did not include the other four Coast Guard operational aircraft (MH-60T,
HC-144A, HC-130H, HC-130J). All pilots participating in the study are designated in
aircraft model type and currently meet proficiency standards defined in the Coast Guard
Air Operations Manual (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Also, the CRM experts using the
measurement instrument to analyze mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors during the ITO maneuvers may view the behaviors differently and therefore
affect interrater reliability.
Definition of Key Terms
The following provides further clarity to key terms used within the aviation
industry:
1. Advisory Circular – A document distributed by the Federal Aviation
Administration to guide and inform those involved in the aviation industry. Though not
regulatory in nature, Advisory Circulars provide direction and information on specific
topics and may require implementing by the Federal Aviation Administration (Houston,
n.d.).
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2. Autopilot – “Those units and components that furnish a means of automatically
controlling the aircraft” (Jeppesen, 2012, p. 34)
3. Aviation human factors – Human capabilities and limitations in the aviation
environment and the study of influences that enhance safety and performance of those
operating in the aviation system (Koonce, 1979).
4. Backup behaviors – “Ability to anticipate other team members’ needs through
accurate knowledge about their responsibilities. This includes the ability to shift
workload among members to achieve balance during high periods of workload or
pressure” (Salas et al., 2005, p. 560).
5. Briefing – “Verbal conference conducted between the pilots before the
beginning of certain phase of workload that will be requiring coordination and therefore
an agreed-upon plan; for example, before takeoff, or before starting an approach to the
destination airport” (Dismukes, Berman, & Loulopoulos, 2007, p. 313). The specific
items of briefings are normally defined in varies aviation operations standard operating
procedures.
6. Cockpit automation – The execution of a task, function, or service by an
automated system such as a flight management system, flight director system, and
autopilot to control navigation, engine power, and system monitoring of the aircraft
(Dismukes et al., 2007; Mouloua et al., 2010).
7. Cockpit flight crew – Members of a cockpit team who hold pilot designations
and perform in-flight duties relating to the operation of a multipiloted aircraft.
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8. Coupled ITO – An instrument takeoff using the aircraft’s flight director system
and automatic flight control system to transition aircraft from a hover to a climb out
profile (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b).
9. Designation – “Certification that a pilot or aircrew member has met training
and experience requirements to operate an aircraft day or night, cross-country, in all
weather conditions for which the aircraft is certified” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, Glossary6).
10. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – “The government agency that
regulates flight operations and safety aspects of commercial aviation in the United States”
(Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 317).
11. Flight Director System – “A form of automatic flight control in which all of
the information is displayed to the pilot rather than being used to actuate control servos”
(Jeppesen, 2012, p. 136). A flight director system can be “coupled” to the aircraft’s flight
controls and provide a means of automatically controlling the aircraft.
12. Flight Safety Officer – A specific billet at aviation commands responsible for
advising and assisting the unit’s Commanding Officer in issues relating to aviation safety
and risk management processes. Interchangeable with the term Aviation Safety Officer.
13. Hindsight bias – A human tendency to evaluate past events in light of what is
now known about the event. This bias can cause a person to oversimplify an event and
assume things blatantly obvious about the event after the fact were obvious during the
event. (Dismukes et al., 2007).
14. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) – An analysis
tool originally developed for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for determining human
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casual factors in aviation accidents. The human casual factor classifications are based on
Reason’s (1990a, 1997) Swiss Cheese Model (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
15. Instrument takeoff (ITO) – A maneuver utilized when ambient conditions
cause reduced visibility, e.g. precipitation, low ceiling, or lack of visible horizon, and
helicopter induced restrictions to visibility such as blowing dust or water caused by the
rotor downwash. ITOs are invaluable aids when taking off at night and toward and over
water or deserted areas (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b; U.S. Navy, 2009).
16. Manual ITO – An instrument takeoff which the pilot flying, also known as
[pilot at the controls], manipulates the flight controls to transition from a hover to a climb
out profile (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b).
17. Mutual performance monitoring – “The ability to develop common
understandings of the team environment and apply appropriate task strategies to
accurately monitor teammate performance” (Salas et al., 2005).
18. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – “U.S. government agency
responsible for investigating and determining the probable cause of civil aviation
accidents” (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 324).
19. Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) – A flight simulation device representing
aircraft flight and system characteristics used to train individual pilots or cockpit flight
crews (Moroney & Moroney (2010). Interchangeable with the term flight simulator.
20. Operational Risk Management (ORM) – “A continuous, systematic process
for identifying and controlling risks. The process includes detecting hazards, assessing
risks, and implementing and monitoring risk controls to support effective, risk-based
decision making” (U. S. Coast Guard, 2002).
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21. Pilot at the controls – “The pilot operating the flight controls (cyclic,
collective, and pedals)…The [pilot at the controls] is responsible for movement and
maneuvering of the aircraft via control inputs with reference to either visual or instrument
information.” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p. 4-1). Interchangeable with the term pilot
flying.
22. Pilot flying – The pilot who is controlling the aircraft in flight by manipulating
the flight controls, thrust or power control levers, and flight management system
(Dismukes et al., 2007).
23. Pilot in command – The pilot, in a multipiloted aircraft, who has been
delegated to take charge of the aircraft and be accountable for a specific flight or mission.
Normally, the pilot in command is normally the pilot in the aircraft who holds the highest
designation and qualification in aircraft type. “The [pilot in command] is responsible for
the safe, orderly, efficient and effective performance of the aircraft, aircrew and
passengers during the entire mission” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, p. 2-6).
24. Pilot monitoring – Pilot responsible for monitoring the actions of the pilot
flying, aircraft systems, and radio communications. (Dismukes et. al., 2007; U.S. Coast
Guard, 2013) Interchangeable with the term safety pilot and pilot not at the controls.
Safety pilot –
During dual pilot operation of the aircraft, the safety pilot is the pilot not
operating the flight controls. The safety pilot provides backup to the pilot
operating the aircraft controls by performing cockpit duties such as checklists,
briefings, communications, and cockpit automation tasks. In general, the safety
pilot should handle any cockpit duty that may potentially distract the [pilot at the
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controls] from concentration on flight control operation with reference to visual or
instrument information. During critical phases of flight, the safety pilot shall
monitor the flight controls as much as practicable. The safety pilot should have
his/her hands near the primary flight controls to allow monitoring of the [pilot at
the controls’] flight control inputs and be prepared to assist in aircraft control or to
take over the flight controls if the situation dictates. (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p.
4-1)
25. Shared mental models – “An organizing knowledge structure of the
relationships among the task the team is engaged in and how the team members will
interact” (Salas et al., 2005, p. 561). Shared mental models provide a common
understanding between team members and allows them to anticipate what is required by
the other team members (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999).
26. Sociotechnical system – A system consisting of complex interactions between
personnel and the technology in the workplace and includes societal infrastructures and
behavior in the organization. “Sociotechnical systems contain people, equipment and
organizational structures...linked by functional processes and social processes which are
informal but which may serve to either facilitate or hinder the functional processes”
(Harris, 2011, p. 7).
27. Threat and error management – Assuming that human error is inevitable,
threat and error management is a three layer error defense countermeasure strategy
including 1) avoiding error, 2) trapping errors before they are occur, and 3) managing the
effects of errors that occur and are not trapped (Helmreich et al., 1999).
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28. Total pilot time – “Time spent at a flight control position (in an authorized
aircraft or simulator) by Coast Guard aviators and student pilots who are assigned duty
involving flying” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, Glossary-17).
Chapter Summary
Aviation CRM is an accepted practice in the industry for increasing flight crew
effectiveness by improving teamwork processes. Understanding the role of shared mental
models among flight crews and their impact on mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors can lead to clearer CRM instructional strategies and training outcomes.
Chapter II of this study shows recent Coast Guard aircraft accidents, views on human
error in complex systems, and the history of CRM in commercial and military aviation.
New views of human error and recent research of teamwork processes associated with
shared mental models shed new light on the role of team coordination CRM skills of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors and their ability to improve
cockpit flight crew performance in multipiloted aircraft.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This section first reviews the recent increase in Coast Guard aircraft accidents and
resulting impact to CRM training. Aviation CRM was initially a response to human error
in the cockpit and the failure of flight crew coordination and communication in
commercial and military aircraft cockpits. A more recent understanding of human error
in the cockpit includes the role of organizations in aircraft accidents which suggests a
more systemic view of aircraft accidents (Reason, 1990a, 1997, 2008) and inevitability of
human error in complex sociotechnical systems (Cook et al., 2004; Dekker, 2006;
Perrow, 1999). Teamwork processes significantly influence the effectiveness of teams in
highly dynamic work environments such as aircraft cockpits (Marks, Mathieu, &
Zaccaro, 2001; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), and shared mental models
among flight crews lead to improved teamwork process of pilot monitoring and backup
behaviors (Grote et al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett,
2011).
Coast Guard Aviation
Aircraft are a primary asset in the execution of Coast Guard missions and
Maritime Domain Awareness (Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, 2005;
U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). The Coast Guard has utilized aircraft to enhance search,
rescue, and law enforcement maritime operations for nearly a hundred years. With close
ties to naval aviation and following a similar developmental path (U. S. Coast Guard
Aviation Association, 2003-2006), Coast Guard aviation provides a major operational
capability to the Coast Guard by operating nearly two hundred rotary-wing and fixed-
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wing aircraft in the U.S. maritime environment. However, aircraft mishaps (accidents)
reduce operational effectiveness, cost lives, and damage and destroy valuable assets.
Department of Defense Services and Coast Guard Aviation Accidents
Table 1 shows a comparison between Class A flight mishap rate averages of
Department of Defense services and Coast Guard since 2000 (see Appendix A for flight
mishap classifications).
Table 1
Department of Defense and Coast Guard Class A flight Annual Mishap Rates 2000-2012
and Twelve-Year Average 1

Fiscal Year

Air Force

Army

Marine
Corps

Navy

2000

0

1.1

0.6

1.85

2.69

2001

1.93

1.2

1.0

1.25

1.3

2002

0

1.45

2.5

1.8

3.89

2003

0

1.2

2.65

2.2

2.91

2004

0

1.1

2.1

1.1

5.18

2005

0.87

1.5

2.4

1.5

2.5

2006

1.81

0.9

1.7

1.6

1.9

2007

0.84

1.3

1.0

1.0

2.05

2008

0.86

1.25

1.2

1.5

2.26

2009

0

0.8

2.06

1.15

1.41

2010

4.26

0.71

1.68

0.75

1.46

2011

0

0.76

1.1

0.95

2.44

2012

0.88

1.01

1.7

0.98

2.17

0.88

1.12

1.67

1.36

2.47

Average

1

Coast Guard

Class A flight mishaps per 100,000 flight hours is an aviation industry standard enabling the normalizing
of standard safety data across multiple aviation operations and organizations.
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As seen in Table 1, the Coast Guard average annual rate remained below other
services. However, in fiscal year 2010 the Coast Guard experienced five Class A flight
mishaps costing the organization $124,860,386 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). These five
Class A flight mishaps represent the highest annual Class A flight mishap cost ever
experienced by the Coast Guard (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). As shown in Table 1 and
Figure 2, the five Class A flight mishaps resulted in an annual mishap rate of 4.26 per
100,000 flight hours (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).

Coast Guard Class A Flight Mishaps
(per 100,000 Flight Hours)
4.5

Mishap Rate

4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 2. Coast Guard Class A Flight Mishap Rate Fiscal Year 2000-2012
With the exception of the U. S. Marine Corps 2004 annual mishap rate of 5.18,
the Coast Guard’s Class A flight mishap rate of 4.26 in 2010 is higher than all
Department of Defense aviation counterparts for the period from FY00 to FY12 (see
Table 1). Until 2010, the Coast Guard averaged one Class A flight mishap a year for
nearly 30 years, and the last time the Coast Guard experienced more than two Class A
flight mishaps in a single year was 1982 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). The five Class A
mishaps in 2010 ended a traditionally stable mishap rate and flight safety record and
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prompted a comprehensive review of all aspects of Coast Guard aviation (U.S. Coast
Guard , 2010a).
Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan
In May of 2010, after a seven-month period involving four of the Class A flight
mishaps, Coast Guard leaders chartered the Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan (M.
Emerson, personal communication, July 28, 2010). The Aviation Safety Assessment
Action Plan was a comprehensive review of Coast Guard aviation operations with the
goal of enhancing flight safety, improving operational effectiveness, and identifying
mishap reduction opportunities. The focus of the effort was not individual mishap
investigations but an overarching review attempting to “identify underlying common
contributory factors present in the Coast Guard aviation environment” (U.S. Coast Guard,
2010a, p. 3). Coast Guard leaders were interested in exploring subtle negative influences
possibly undermining the aviation culture environment. The Aviation Safety Assessment
Action Plan consisted of five distinct analysis components: (a) an operational hazard
analysis, (b) an aviation data collection and safety survey, (c) aviation leadership
improvement focus group, (d) an independent data analysis and process assessment
study, and (e) Coast Guard aviation association industry benchmarking study (U.S. Coast
Guard, 2010a).
After the yearlong multifaceted review, the findings identified five overarching
Coast Guard aviation deficiencies (J. P. Currier, personal communication, October 15,
2011), with four of the deficiencies directly relating to human factors. One specific
human factor finding was the degradation of ORM and CRM practices. According to the
U.S. Coast Guard (2012), CRM is “the effective use of all available resources – human
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resources, hardware, and information – with the goal of optimizing human performance
and reducing human error in the aviation environment” (p. 9). The major tenets of Coast
Guard CRM are flight discipline, leadership, risk management, decision making,
situational awareness, communications, and assertiveness (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.-a).
Though Coast Guard CRM has been in place since the early 1990s, the Aviation Safety
Assessment Action Plan found problems in CRM training delivery methods and less than
optimum targeting of training audiences (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a). The plan’s findings
resulted in several CRM training improvement initiatives. A memorandum from then
Commanding Officer of ATC Mobile outlined two actions taken in response to CRM
findings: first, specific unit-based CRM discussions and review of human factors aircraft
mishap as part of the annual standardization visit to Coast Guard Air Stations, and
second, a written assessment of CRM skills on all pilot evaluation check flights (S. C.
Truhlar, personal communication, September 1, 2010). The unit-based CRM discussion
and associated mishap review allowed CRM training to be tailored specifically to the
unit’s aircraft, daily flying environment, and mission, and the CRM written assessment
provided feedback on individual pilot CRM strengths and documented areas for
improvement (T. D. Jones, personal communication, November 10, 2010; S. C. Truhlar,
personal communication, September 1, 2010)
Though changes were made to Coast Guard CRM training as a result of the
Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan findings, senior leader support and commitment
to CRM tenets and training remained high. Vice Admiral (VADM) J.P. Currier, Vice
Commandant of the Coast Guard and highest ranking Coast Guard aviator, strongly
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emphasized the role of CRM and teamwork among flight crewmembers during an
interview about Coast Guard flight crew proficiency and initiative:
Everyone in the [flight] crew has a part to play in the success of that mission.
And our principles, including CRM, are such that everyone has a voice. If you’re
not comfortable, you’re duty-bound to speak up. Clearly, the aircraft commander
makes the final call, but we all have a role and voice. On a crewed aircraft, we fly
best as a team. (Johnson, 2013, p. 9)
Considering the recent findings and recommendations of the Aviation Safety Assessment
Action Plan, a review of Coast Guard mishaps shows that human error, and specifically
CRM failures, is not a recent trend.
Human Error in Coast Guard Aviation
Aviation human factors mishap data helps deconstruct system failures and enables
a more thorough identification of hazards (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012). A review of Coast
Guard Class A aviation mishaps for the past 20 years indicates human factors a central
causal factor contributing to at least nineteen of the twenty-four Class A mishaps (79%;
B. A. Potter, personal communication, March 1, 2013). This 79% closely aligns with the
60-80% human error accidents percentage normally cited in other military and
commercial aviation mishap analysis (e.g., Flin et al., 2008; O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007;
Wiegman & Shappell, 2003). Coast Guard aviation safety leaders suggest that human
error in aviation mishaps is as high as 85% and is the most common cause factor in Coast
Guard aviation mishaps (U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a). In fact, human error in Coast Guard
cockpits led to the recent adoption of the Department of Defense Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for mishap analysis (U.S. Coast Guard,
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2010a) The Department of Defense HFACS framework allows a better understanding of
the underlying human factor causes in aviation accidents (Gibb & Olson, 2008). See
Charnon (2012) for a complete review of HFACS and its use in Coast Guard aviation
mishap trend analysis following the 2003 organizational move from Department of
Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security.
Further review of Coast Guard Class A flight mishaps shows that 18 mishap
reports directly cited or inferred a breakdown or lack of CRM among flight
crewmembers. (B. A. Potter, personal communication, March 1, 2013). A review of the
eight most recent Coast Guard Class A flight mishap administrative investigations
(FY06-FY12) reveals that seven of the mishaps contain specific CRM failures (Allen,
2009; Brice-O’Hara, 2012; Currier, 2013; Neffenger, 2012 & 2013; Pearson, 2009;
Salerno, 2012). Despite training CRM tenets to flight crews, CRM failures continue to
occur in Coast Guard cockpits.
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation, a comparable maritime service to the U.S.
Coast Guard, experienced similar CRM-related failure rates among cockpit flight crews.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ seven CRM critical skills are similar to the Coast
Guard’s: (a) mission analysis, (b) leadership, (c) risk management, (d) decision making,
(e) situational awareness, (f) adaptability/flexibility, (g) communications, and (f)
assertiveness (U.S. Navy, 2011). Examining Naval Aviation Class A mishaps, Jones
(2009) found 69% of rotary wing and tactical jet aircraft accidents from 1997 to 2007
listed CRM failure as one of the accident causal factor.
However, Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell (2004) found a mismatch between the
training of CRM tenets and CRM failures in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Analyzing
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U.S. Navy and Marine Corps accidents between 1990 and 2000, Wilson-Donnelly and
Shappell found six major CRM failure groupings: (a) failure to conduct adequate
briefing, (b) failure to utilize resources, (c) lack of communication, (d)
miscommunication, (e) failure to monitor, and (f) failure to backup/assist. WilsonDonnelly and Shappell believe the six major CRM failure groupings indicate a
misalignment between the CRM critical skills taught to flight crews and the type of CRM
failures actually occurring in U.S. Navy and Marine Corps cockpits. An analysis of the
seven Coast Guard Flight A flight mishaps containing specific CRM failures show at
least one of the six Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell CRM failure groupings occurring in
all mishaps. More interesting is the fact that failing to backup and assist other flight
crewmembers occurred in six mishaps, suggesting a misalignment between Coast Guard
CRM training and actual cockpit CRM failures similar to the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps finding by Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell (2004).
Human Error
Human error is the failure to achieve desired consequences or planned actions
leading to unintended consequences and accidents (Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee,
1995; Reason, 1990a). Major accidents in complex systems such as nuclear power
plants, marine and rail transport, chemical process plants, off-shore oil platforms, and
commercial aviation can be linked to human error (Reason, 1990b). Humans performing
in cognitively demanding real world situations often find themselves facing complex and
uncertain situations (Cook et al., 2004). Well-known accidents, e.g. Three Mile Island;
Chernobyl; Challenger; Exxon Valdez; and more recently, the 2009 Air France Flight
#447 en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, represent catastrophic accidents involving
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human failures in complex technologies and sociotechnical systems (Reason, 1990a;
Zolli, 2012). A review of 37 significant safety operating events at commercial nuclear
power plants show human error contributed significantly to nearly all events (Gertman et
al., 2001). The health care system is at least a decade behind to other high-risk industries
in basic safety, and human error results in as many as 98,000 deaths each year exceeding
that of motor-vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS (National Research Council,
2000). Human error costs hospitals nationwide $17 billion to $29 billion per year
(National Research Council, 2000). According to Davies (2001), the medical community
is slow to recognize the universal role of human error and is continually pressured to
perform without error.
From 1960s to the 1990s, human error in hazardous systems increased fourfold
and now represents approximately 80-90% of all major accidents (Maurino et al., 1995;
Reason, 1997). According to Flin et al. (2008), errors in human non-technical skills have
played a major role in serious nuclear power plant incidents such as Three Mile Island
and Chernobyl. Since 1979, human error has occurred in 14 of the major maritime,
military, police, healthcare, petrochemical, transport and aviation accidents (Flin et al.,
2008). Of those 14 major industry accidents, teamwork and team coordination failures
were major contributors in seven of the accidents (Flin et al., 2008). However, Reason
(1997) cautions using the broad label of human error since it may misrepresent how and
why accidents actually occurred and fails to acknowledge the human contribution to
safety by those frontline professionals operating in complex organizational systems.
Hollnagel (2012) further argues that neither simple nor complex linear thinking is
insufficient for understanding sequences of causes and effects in accidents and suggests
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that recent accidents like the Challenger explosion and Chernobyl meltdown emphasize
the need to recognize non-technical aspects of sociotechnical systems.
Simple Cause and Effect Linear Sequencing of Human Error
A simple cause and effect linear sequencing perspective promotes the view that
human error is an aspect of human performance that is substandard or flawed (Woods,
Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010). Simply stated, the label of human error in
accident analysis infers that 1) human performance immediately prior the accident was
flawed, and 2) inadequate human performance directly attributed to the accident (Woods
et al., 2010). According to Woods et al., the common belief is that human performance is
distinctly separate from the represented system, and errors occur either within the human
side or within the represented system. Separating the human from the system enforces
the idea that human error is correctable by changing the behaviors of individuals
operating within the system (Woods et al., 2010). With simple linear cause and effect
perspective, human error is avoidable and a product of human cognition defects
(Maurino, 1999; Reason, 2008). Eliminating the error (cause) will eliminate the accident
(effect).
According to Reason (2008), believing that human error is avoidable promotes a
human-as-hazard perspective. Human-as-hazard advocates believe that highly trained
frontline professionals have a moral obligation to care and avoid making errors (Reason,
2008) and that human errors are a result of carelessness; inattention; distraction; or the
lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness (Dismukes et al., 2007). The human-ashazard perspective or “bad apple theory” fosters the view that humans are the dominant
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contributor to accidents and that “complex systems would be fine, were it not for the
erratic behavior of some unreliable people (bad apples) in it” (Dekker, 2006, p. 1).
Complex Cause and Effect Linear Sequencing of Human Error
According to Dismukes et al. (2007), accidents usually involve human
performance characteristics and their complex interaction with task demands,
environment condition and events, and social and organizational influences. Reason
(1990a) argues that social and organizational factors lead to accidents because of
weaknesses or gaps in a complex system. Reason’s (1990a, 1997) Swiss Cheese Model
portrays the sequence of holes in organizational defenses attributed to active failures and
latent conditions which eventually line up, allowing an accident trajectory through the
layers of defense.
According to Wiegman and Shappell (2003), Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model
provides the unifying theoretical framework for integrating all human error perspectives
but argue that the Swiss Cheese Model is too theoretical in nature and “as a result,
analysts, investigators, and other safety professionals have had a difficult time applying
Reason’s [(1990a, 1997)] model to the real world” (p. 50). Wiegman and Shappell
(2003) believe the Swiss Cheese Model is primarily descriptive and argue that their
HFACS provides the analytical tool for accident investigation and determining human
error latent conditions and active failures. However, Wilson et al. (2007) believe that
despite human error classification frameworks such as HFACS, labeling human error as a
root cause of an accident is “too broad and leaves much to one’s imagination as to what
really occurred” (p. 246). Similarly, Diehl (1997) argues that human error is easy to
classify but extremely difficult to predict and even more difficult to correct.
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According to Hollnagel (2012), determining human error resulting from
technological, psychological, environmental, and organizational influences represents
complex sequence-of-events linear thinking implying both order and cause and effect.
Using sequence-of-events linear thinking for determining human error in accident
investigations does little to explain the complex nature of systems in which accidents
occur. Sequence-of-events cause and effect investigations promote the human-as-hazard
view by attributing accident causes to human mistakes, deficient supervision, ineffective
leadership, lack of appropriate rules and procedures, or some deficiencies in human or
represented system performance (Woods et al., 2010). According to Hollnagel, simple
and complex sequence-of-events linear thinking investigations attempt to identify human
error actions in accidents based on future outcomes yet to be determined when the human
error action occurred. Sequence-of-events linear thinking fosters hindsight bias which
fosters a cause-consequence equivalence (Dekker, 2006). Dekker further argues that
hindsight bias turns convoluted complexity into a simple, linear story and oversimplifies
the events which actually occurred and destroys the ability to look objectively at past
events judged as human error.
Complexity of Sociotechnical Theoretical Perspective of Human Error
Today’s sociotechnical systems are highly complex and involve the interaction of
humans and technology to deliver results from the human-machine collaboration.
Sociotechnical systems contain people and equipment and operate within social systems
of organizational goals, policies, and procedures (Harris, 2011; Qureshi, 2008).
Sociotechnical systems also contain legal, political, cultural, and environment
components (Qureshi, 2008). According to Dekker (2006), human error in sociotechnical
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systems is an “inevitable by-product of the pursuit of success in an imperfect, unstable,
resource-constrained world” (p. 65). Dekker (2006) believes that complex sociotechnical
systems do not exist to be safe, but on the contrary, they exist to make money, render a
service, or provide a product. Accidents in complex sociotechnical systems such as
nuclear power plants, marine and rail transport, chemical process plants, and commercial
aviation are inevitable because those systems are high-risk and intrinsically hazardous
(Cook et al., 2004; Perrow, 1999). Because sociotechnical systems are highly complex
and intrinsically hazardous, accidents normally represent failures in adapting to systems’
complexity and interactions instead of human performance failures (Hollnagel, 2012).
Researchers suggest humans create safety in sociotechnical systems (Cook et al.,
2004; Dekker, 2006; Reason, 1997, 2008). Cook et al. (2004) argue that in
sociotechnical systems, humans continuously create safety by adapting to changing
conditions moment to moment. Reason (2008) identifies the ability to adapt to changing
conditions as human variability and argues for its necessity for safeguarding imperfect
systems in an uncertain and dynamic world. Safety is created predominantly by human
resilience and flexibility (Dekker, 2006). According to Hollnagel (2012), sociotechnical
systems are enhanced by the ability of humans to respond, monitor, learn, and anticipate.
Opposed to having safety, humans do safety in sociotechnical systems. Humans do
safety by continually assessing and revising performance that is sensitive to the
possibility of failure and by knowing and monitoring risk boundaries (Woods et al.,
2010). Humans create safety because, unlike computers, they are equipped to make
rational decisions in novel situations when information is incomplete, contradicting,
ambiguous, and even missing (Dismukes, 2009). Reason (2008) defines the human
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contribution to creating safety in complex, intrinsically unsafe sociotechnical systems as
the “human-as-hero” perspective and argues that frontline professionals (e.g. nuclear
power plant operators, commercial pilots) often represent the last line of defense against
major accidents.
Human Error in Aviation
Since the early days of powered flight, the human-machine interface has proven
to be the most challenging aspects of human flight (Hobbs, 2004). Despite increased
safety through technology and aviation system improvements, human error remains the
primary cause of aviation accidents and loss of life (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003;
Dismukes et al., 2007; Flin et al., 2008). From 1959 to 1980, flight crew error was the
primary cause of 76% of aircraft accidents among the worldwide commercial jet fleet,
and from 1981 to 1990, flight crew error was the primary cause of 70.5% of aircraft
accidents among the worldwide commercial jet fleet (Weener, 1992). However, during
the same period of time, aircraft malfunctions were responsible for only 11% of all
commercial aviation accidents (Weener, 1992).
According to Darby (2006), from 1996 to 2005, 55% of all aircraft accidents were
caused by crew error. Darby is quick to note that the recent reduction of crew error in
aircraft accidents is likely due to changes in weather reporting, Air Traffic Control, and
aircraft maintenance reporting procedures. Some argue that improvements to aircraft
materials, aviation engineering techniques, and weather reporting procedures have not
increased human error in aviation per se, but instead have brought the role of human error
in aircraft accidents into greater prominence (Fraher, 2011; Reason, 2008). Hobbs (2004)
argues that human error in aviation is not a recent phenomenon. Analyzing Australian
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Transport Safety Bureau data of aircraft accidents in the early 20th century, the author
found that pilot error contributed to nearly 70% of accidents. Hobbs argues human error
has been a flight safety issue since the early days of aviation. Whether human error is a
recent phenomenon or existing since the early days of aviation, Wells (2001) believes
that human error by cockpit flight crews represents the single greatest threat to flight
safety in today’s commercial aviation.
Human error in aviation, specifically in the cockpit environment, is traditionally
labeled “pilot error.” However, according to Diehl (1997), the term pilot error focuses
the blame of the accident instead of identifying and finding solutions to the problem.
Dekker (2006) believes assigning human error to aircraft mishaps often leads to a
dangerous, single-minded view that focuses the blame solely on the pilot who committed
the error rather than constructing the underlying causes of error. According to Dismukes
et al. (2007), aircraft accidents involve “a complex interaction of inherent human
performance characteristics with task demands, environmental events and conditions, and
social and organizational factors” (p. 300).
Human error in aviation exists because, like other complex sociotechnical
systems, the aviation system is inherently unsafe and represents a continual contradiction
between operational efficiency and safety (Dekker, 2006). There is a natural tendency to
believe the aviation system is inherently safe and that the people operating in the system
are unreliable and subject to deviations causing aircraft accidents (Pelegrin, 2013).
Dismukes et al. (2007) suggest that inappropriate actions or omissions by flight crews are
many times cited as probable causes only because of their proximity to aircraft accident
final events.
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Human Error in Flight Crew Non-technical Skills
In the 1970s, aviation psychologists and accident investigators at the NASAAmes Research Center began exploring broader human factors issues associated with
flight operations (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Based on simple linear thinking cause
and effect accident investigations, flight crew human factors data seem to point to
inadequacies in non-technical skills such as team communication, coordination, workload
management, situational awareness, task allocation, and resource utilization for safe
flight operations. At the same time, a series of fatal commercial airline accidents caused
by the lack of communication, coordination, and backup behavior between the aircraft
flight crews accented the need for pilot training that is more non-technical and
psychosocial in nature.
In 1978, United Airlines Flight #173 experienced a total breakdown of situational
awareness and communication near Portland, Oregon, when flight crewmembers failed to
comprehend a critical fuel state and successfully communicate their concern with the
captain (Kanki, 2010; NTSB, 1979). The aircraft crashed after running out of fuel in
flight (NTSB, 1979). Four years later, a lack of flight crew communication, coupled with
improper engine anti-icing procedures before takeoff and weather departure delays,
resulted in Air Florida Flight #90 crashing into the Potomac River immediately after
takeoff from Washington National Airport (NTSB, 1982). In fact, when the aircraft was
stalling, an aerodynamic condition where the aircraft wings fail to produce enough lift
required to maintain flight, the pilots failed to verbalize anything prompting a stall
recovery response even though both were fully qualified in stall recovery procedures
(Kanki & Smith, 2001).
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Six years later in 1988, Delta Airlines Flight #1141 crashed on takeoff after
failing to follow checklist procedures and configuring the aircraft flaps for takeoff
(NTSB, 1989). The accident investigation revealed that the first officer became
distracted with an extended social conversation with an on-board flight attendant during
taxi prior to takeoff (NTSB, 1989). Though the captain did not extensively participate in
the conversation, he failed to “control the group processes and did not establish work
priorities or demonstrate a concern for operational duties” required for safe flight
(Helmreich & Foushee, 2010, p. 23).
Foushee (1984) notes that crew redundancy in an aviation multipiloted cockpit is
necessary to improve the safety margin, but argues this safety margin diminishes when
captains fail to heed the warnings of other crewmembers and when crewmembers fail to
provide the necessary and timely backup. Citing a NASA study by Cooper, White, and
Lauber, Foushee (1984) agrees with the hazards of crew performance processes
breakdowns and suggests that crew coordination factors should receive more aviation
research and training attention.
A NASA research project originally designed to investigate individual pilot
vigilance, workload, and response to stress providentially brought a new clarity to the
reoccurring team communication and coordination failures among flight crew (Ruffell
Smith, 1979). According to Helmreich and Foushee (2010), Ruffell Smith’s flight crew
interaction study demonstrates the operational significance of crew interactions. The
primary conclusion of the study is that human errors are a result of breakdowns in crew
coordination rather than shortfalls in pilot technical knowledge and skills. Poor cockpit
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leadership directly affects the timely exchange of critical information during periods of
work overload and task saturation (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).
Because of the NASA study, the accident investigators began looking at human
error in team processes and team effectiveness among flight crews using linear sequenceof-event accident investigation methodology. Flight safety was now focusing on
understanding and promoting team communication and coordination processes in
multipiloted cockpits. Foushee (1984) suggests an early challenge in cockpits was
shifting from “The Right Stuff” traditional pilot mentality of self-reliant, macho, and
decisive, characterized by the Tom Wolfe novel, to a professional pilot culture stressing
cockpit team effectiveness (Wolfe, 1979).
Crew Resource Management
Early attempts to improve flight team processes was initially called Cockpit
Resource Management with roots dating back to a 1979 NASA conference exploring the
causes of commercial airline accidents (Orlady & Foushee, 1987). Helmreich et al.
(1999) believe that many of the commercial air carriers attending the conference left
“committed to developing new training programs to enhance the interpersonal aspects of
flight operations” (p. 19). Lauber (1987), a NTSB researcher present at the 1979 NASA
conference, defined Cockpit Resource Management as “the effective utilization of all
available resources—hardware, software, and liveware—to achieve safe, efficient flight
operations” (p. 9). Liveware refers to the flight crewmembers performing cockpit team
functions. Cockpit Resource Management became a systematic approach to improving
aviation safety by training flight crews on leadership, human performance,
communication, and cooperation (Dahlstrom & Dekker, 2010). According to Harris
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(2011), the advent of CRM introduced social psychology and management to the cockpit
environment. The cockpit work environment shifted from traditional "stick and rudder"
skills to a managing the flight crew in a highly automated aircraft environment
(Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Flight crew management included complex human capital
skills such as judgment, problem solving, social relationships, personality, motivation,
communication, and coordination.
According to Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, and Howse (2006a), CRM is a
common instructional strategy for team training. Citing Orasanu, Martin, and Davison
(2001), Dekker (2006) believes that effective CRM contains the following:
•

Shared understanding of the situation, the nature of the problem, the cause of
the problem, the meaning of available cues, and what is likely to happen in the
future, with or without action by the teams members;

•

Shared understanding of the goal or desired outcome;

•

Shared understanding of the solution strategy; what will be done, by whom,
when, and why? (p. 129)

History of CRM Training
Early CRM training was in response to the human as hazard theoretical
perspective of human error and focused on improving flight crew attitudes, leadership,
and communications using psychological testing and interpersonal behavior training
(Helmreich et al., 1999; Maurino & Murray, 2010). The goal of CRM training was
changing attitudes toward cockpit group interaction and flight crew management.
Therefore, early CRM training programs were intended to correct communication errors
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such as the lack of assertiveness by copilots and dictatorial personalities of captains
(Helmreich et al., 1999).
The NTSB made its first direct reference to CRM in accident report
recommendations after the 1978 United Airlines flight #173 crash near Portland, Oregon
(NTSB, 1979). The NTSB recommendations specifically asked the FAA to urge all air
carriers to instruct their crewmembers on flight deck resource management principles
with “particular emphasis on the merits of participative management for captains and
assertiveness training for other cockpit crewmembers” (NTSB, 1979, p. 30). Over the
next few years, NTSB accident investigation reports continued to recommend applying
the findings of CRM research to commercial pilot training programs in an effort to reduce
cockpit human error.
By the mid-1980s, commercial airlines embraced CRM and incorporated team
communication and coordination principles into their pilot training programs. A jointly
sponsored NASA/U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command CRM conference in 1987
validated the spread of the CRM training throughout commercial and military aviation
(Orlady & Foushee, 1987). Cockpit crew team building, briefing strategies, situation
awareness, the management of crew stress, and crew decision-making principles were
becoming part of CRM training. (Helmreich et al., 1999; Maurino & Murray, 2010). The
new emphasis on cockpit group dynamics and team-oriented training led to the renaming
of CRM to Crew Resource Management…a label that still exists today. According to
Maurino and Murray, early CRM efforts purposefully maintained a clear separation
between aviation technical skills, i.e. flying the aircraft, and flight crew non-technical
skills, i.e. assertiveness.
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Beginning in the early 1990s, CRM non-technical skills were integrated with
flight crew technical training (FAA, 1991). This integration, coupled with the
introduction of electro-optical instrument displays (glass cockpits), led to CRM training
components focusing on small team cognitive applications, human performance, and the
human-machine interface (Maurino & Murray, 2010). According to Maurino and
Murray, a major step forward in CRM non-technical and technical training integration
was an underlying paradigm shift in aviation safety from reactive to proactive and the
integration of vigilance and human reliability.
In 1993, the FAA published initial guidance on developing, implementing,
reinforcing, and assessing CRM training. Distributed as Advisory Circular 120-51 and
nearly ten years after the introduction of CRM, the circular was the FAA’s first attempt to
define how CRM programs play a role in air carrier training and operations (Farrow,
2010; Wilson, Guthrie, Salas, & Howse, 2010). Advisory Circular 120-51 (1993) states
the mission of CRM training is to “prevent aviation accidents by improving crew
performance through better crew coordination” (p. 4), and suggests CRM curriculum
topics of communication processes, decision making, and team building. However, the
theoretical basis for FAA CRM guidance was optimizing human performance by
reducing human error.
By the late 1990s, CRM training began reflecting influence of management
actions or inactions, organizational synergy, flight crew interaction, and shared mental
models (Maurino & Murray, 2010). By the end of the 20th century, researchers began
questioning the intended results of CRM training. Helmreich et al. (1999) suggest that on
the surface, CRM training seems to resolve the problems of human error by making it an
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fundamental part of all flight training but argue that the initial overarching rationale of
reducing crew-based human error had been lost. Early CRM training efforts attempted to
train specific flight crew behaviors for increasing flight safety, but the focus of early
CRM generations was imperfect by attempting to eliminate human error (Maurino, 1999;
Helmreich et al., 1999).
Threat and Error Management
Human error is ubiquitous and inevitable and a result of the natural limitations of
human performance in complex systems and forms the basis for threat and error
management introduced to CRM training in the late 1990s (Helmreich et al., 1999). The
goal of CRM threat and error management is the trapping and mitigating of errors within
the aviation system before they become consequential (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).
Advocates of threat and error management believe that flight crew CRM behaviors
should evaluate external and internal threats then determine corrective actions (Helmreich
et al., 2001). The management of threats and errors provides a contextual framework that
defines CRM skills as error countermeasures (Maurino & Murray, 2010). Kontogiannis
and Malakis (2009) recognize that elimination of human error is difficult to achieve and
that many times errors are associated with adverse consequences in complex situations
involving high workload and high stress decision making. Therefore, the essence of
CRM threat and error management is not the prevention of human error but the stopping
of adverse consequences through the detection and correction of errors (Kontogiannis &
Malakis, 2009). Although many commercial and military aviation CRM programs have
incorporated threat and error management, Fraher (2011) argues that threat and error
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management programs are ineffective in helping flight crews innovate, increase situation
awareness, develop shared mental models, and enhance cockpit teamwork.
Human Error Theoretical Perspective for CRM Training
From the beginning, the goal of CRM in aviation was increasing team
effectiveness by eliminating communication and coordination errors among cockpit flight
crews. Originally created to increase communication between non-assertive copilots and
captains with strong personalities and leadership styles, flight crew CRM training
programs evolved to include other non-technical skills such as situational awareness, risk
management, and decision-making. By 2000, CRM training incorporated threat and error
management attempting to recognize the inevitability of human error in the cockpit.
Threat and error management remains prevalent in aviation CRM training programs
today.
CRM in U.S. Military Aviation
Aviation CRM training in the U.S. military is a direct result of commercial
aviation CRM programs starting a decade earlier (O’Conner, Hahn, & Nullmeyer, 2010).
By 1989, and following commercial carrier CRM training models, each service (Army,
Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) had at least one CRM program among various
squadrons and aviation units (Prince & Salas, 1993). Prince and Salas believe that CRM
may have developed more slowly within the military than in commercial aviation because
of the lack of aviation human error evidence, the organizational makeup of each service,
the variety of missions and training requirements of each service, and the absence of
public pressure associated with the loss of multiple lives with commercial carrier widebody aircraft. Though many of the military services initially labeled their CRM as
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aircrew coordination training, the overall purpose was similar to commercial aviation
efforts (Prince & Salas, 1993).
Cavanaugh and Williams (1987) believe that CRM principles are applicable to
both military and commercial cockpit flight crews. However, Cavanaugh and Williams
suggest that significant differences exist between military and commercial cockpit flight
crews and caution against applying generic CRM training solutions to both. Cavanaugh
and Williams sum these significant differences into six main categories: 1) impact of
military rank; 2) purpose of the aviation mission; 3) crew qualifications differences with
commercial aviation flight crews; 4) crew lifestyle and aviation job requirements; 5)
absence of union and employee/employer relationships; and 6) other differences
including training, crew communication, and flight crew protocol. Prince and Salas
(1993) believe that the differences between commercial and military aviation identified
by Cavanaugh and Williams (1987) fall under three general categories: (a) task (aviation
mission requirement, flying conditions, and equipment); (b) people (flight crew makeup
and experience); and (c) organization (military cockpit and organization structure
differences).
O’Conner et al. (2010) suggest that factors such as mission timing constraints,
multiple unit coordination, and pilot workload represent stark differences between
commercial air carriers and military operations. O’Conner et al. (2010) argue that CRMrelated mishaps occur three times more often in military aviation than in commercial
aviation and that the focus on mission accomplishment, the frequent changing jobs and
military assignments, and the non-homogenous nature of the military aviation units,
create “CRM programmatic challenges” not prevalent in commercial aviation (p. 447).
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Despite differences between military and commercial aviation, U.S. military services
embraced CRM training when research suggested that enhancing flight crew coordination
and communications improves mission effectiveness and flight safety (See Prince &
Salas, 1993 and O’Conner et al., 2010 for a review of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps CRM programs).
CRM in U.S. Coast Guard Aviation
Aviation CRM training is required for all Coast Guard flight crews (U.S. Coast
Guard, 2013). Coast Guard flight crews receive CRM training prior to aircraft flight
training. The goal of the training is improving the performance of individuals and
teamwork with the following objectives:
1. Determining and analyzing personality traits as they relate to aircrew
interaction and problem solving.
2. Improving interpersonal skills and crew communications.
3. Developing and improving participation as an individual and
crewmember in a positive and assertive manner.
4. Developing and enhancing individual and crew situational awareness
skills.
5. Identifying hazardous trends and attitudes through analysis of past
human error mishaps.
6. Presenting a risk management methodology that can help individuals
and crews identify error producing conditions and prevent or mitigate
hazardous situations.
7. Use and management of advanced cockpit technology and automation.
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8. Recognition of the effects of illness, medications, diet, fatigue, and
other self-imposed stressors on in-flight performance.
(U.S. Coast Guard, 2014a, p. 20-3)
Initial CRM training occurs at ATC Mobile for Coast Guard pilots attending their
Coast Guard aircraft qualification course. Refresher CRM training occurs
annually at Coast Guard Air Stations for pilots who have completed initial CRM
training (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).
History of Coast Guard CRM Training
Coast Guard CRM training has similar roots to CRM training in other military
services. In fact, Lieutenant Commander R. Wharton, representing Coast Guard aviation
safety, attended the 1979 joint NASA/MAC conference in San Francisco (Orlady &
Foushee, 1987). Coast Guard CRM training began in the early 1990s focusing on team
communication and coordination skills for multipiloted aircraft using a training program
commercially contracted by the U.S. Army (Prince & Salas, 1993). It was the Coast
Guard’s first attempt to leverage commercially available CRM material and training.
However, one major concern was non-Coast Guard aspects of the training and a need for
Coast Guard-focused specific training. In 1994, Coast Guard aviation safety began
building an “in-house” CRM training solution using Coast Guard aviation instructors (T.
M. McGuire, personal communication, April 26, 2013). By the late 1990s, training on
foundational CRM skills was mandated for all Coast Guard pilots and aircrew. By 1998,
Coast Guard Flight Safety Officers assigned to local aviation units were trained and
authorized to teach CRM training. At first, Coast Guard CRM training was required
within three years after becoming a flight crewmember, allowing aviation units training
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flexibility and the opportunity for new flight crewmembers to obtain operational
experience prior to CRM training.
Initially, the goal of Coast Guard CRM training was the optimal team
performance in a complex multiple task environment through the training of four basic
principles: (a) situational awareness; (b) communications; (c) assertiveness; and (d) risk
management. Aviation instructors also taught common obstructions to the four basic
principles, known as roadblocks, attempting to improve flight crew team effectiveness.
Roadblocks to CRM are negative, ingrained habits, and personal attitudes of flight
crewmembers such as “odd man out,” “hidden agenda,” and “hazardous attitudes” (U.S.
Coast Guard, n.d.-a). The four basic principles and roadblocks represented the core of
Coast Guard CRM training throughout the 1990s. Aspects of error management
(Helmreich et al., 2001) based on the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990a, 1997) were
incorporated by 2002 in an attempt to align Coast Guard CRM training with emerging
research in cockpit human error. Coast Guard flight crew training focused on error
management, the four basic CRM principles, and common roadblocks to effective CRM
in the aircraft.
Coast Guard Enhanced CRM
In 2007, Coast Guard aviation safety and training representatives participated in a
CRM symposium jointly hosted by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU);
aircraft manufacturer Bombardier; and Frasca, the makers of flight training equipment for
airlines and various flight schools and military organizations, (C. Bonner, personal
communication, January 30, 2013). Called ERAU: CRM Vectors 2007, the two-fold
objective of the symposium was identifying the current generation of CRM theory and
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practice and predicting the future of CRM training (Beneigh & Hubbard, 2007). One of
the major defined themes was the training and evaluation of CRM. It was from the
ERAU: CRM Vectors 2007 conference that the Coast Guard began exploring the
feasibility of a comprehensive revision of its CRM training program. Concerns had
grown that CRM training in the Coast Guard had become “a mere check in the box”
without utilizing the latest design, development, implementation and evaluation
techniques (D. R. Callahan, personal communication, June 19, 2007).
By 2008, the Coast Guard out-sourced the revamping of its CRM training for
pilots and flight crews. Known as “Enhanced CRM”, the curriculum incorporates the
latest CRM principles and concepts of University of Central Florida Institute for
Simulation and Training, ERAU, the European Joint Aviation Authority, and
Helmreich’s University of Texas Aerospace Crew Resource Project (D. R. Callahan,
personal communication, June 19, 2007).
Major components of Enhanced CRM are the concepts of airmanship and flight
discipline (Kern, 1997, 1998). Airmanship consists of three fundamental principles: skill,
proficiency, and discipline. Total airmanship “blends technical and tactical expertise,
[pilot] proficiency, and the variety of human factors to smoothly and effectively integrate
the capabilities of the pilot and the machine” (Kern, 1998, p. 8). Kern (1997) suggests
that total airmanship improves situation awareness, reduces human error, and increases
operational effectiveness.
Using an airmanship model, Kern (1998) identifies the personal accountability
and reliability foundation of flight discipline and the interconnectedness of pilot skill,
proficiency, and required expertise leading to situational awareness and judgment.
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Kern’s (1997, 1998) airmanship and flight discipline constructs attempt to improve
aviation safety by improving aviation compliance and accident prevention at the
individual professional pilot level. Kern (1998) argues that the organizational system or
training approach used in the traditional CRM has not produced the desired results of
reducing human error. Moreover, an individual approach of personal accountability and
mental readiness is needed to “identify and predict their own personal error patterns
[which are] based on their unique lives and circumstances” (Kern, 2008, p. 147).
Identifying the conditions leading to errors and violations, Kern (2008) further argues
that flight crews must learn to identify their personal error-producing conditions and
work offensively to mitigate and ultimately reduce and/or prevent them. Enhanced CRM
maintains that aircraft accidents are avoidable by reducing the number of individual
human errors (U. S. Coast Guard, n.d.-b).
Summary of Coast Guard CRM
Coast Guard CRM has followed the developmental path of both commercial and
military aviation efforts and in the beginning used the same contractor outsourcing
support for flight crew training as the U.S. Army (T. M. McGuire, personal
communication, April 26, 2013). The basic principles of situational awareness,
communications, assertiveness, leadership, risk management, and decision-making have
remained Coast Guard CRM tenets since their introduction in the early 1990s. Threat
and error management was introduced in the early 2000s, and flight crews were taught to
evaluate external and internal threats and determine corrective actions (Helmreich et al.,
1999; Helmreich et al., 2001; Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). The recent overhaul of the
CRM training with Kern’s (1997, 1998) airmanship model is an attempt to improve flight
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crew situational awareness; reduce errors; and increase operational effectiveness by using
flight discipline, skills, and proficiency with a thorough knowledge of one’s self, aircraft,
team environment, and risk. However, Coast Guard Enhanced CRM training continues
to align with the theoretical perspective that human error can be reduced and possibly
eliminated.
CRM Skills
Researchers (Flin & Martin, 2001; Helmreich & Foushee, 1993) suggest CRM
skills commonly follow two primary clusters: social skills and cognitive skills. Social
skills represent the interaction between pilots and/or crew through communication and
coordination. Cognitive tasks are the individual tasks that flight crewmembers use to
operate in the aviation environment and deal with how the pilot thinks and processes
information. Cognitive CRM skills include monitoring, crosschecking, problem solving,
and making decisions.
Early CRM training focused on increasing flight crew communication and
coordination. Lauber (1987) credits American Airlines as the first to identify CRM skills
for flight crews: (a) delegation of tasks and assignment of responsibilities, (b)
establishment of priorities, (c) monitoring and crosschecking, (d) use of information, (e)
problem assessment and the avoidance of preoccupation, (f) communications, and (g)
leadership. Flight crew skills identified by early CRM training developers seem to
address the initial human error failures of lack of assertiveness by copilots and dictatorial
personalities by captains.
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By the early 1990s, researchers were identifying CRM critical skills and
expanding on American Airlines’ initial CRM skills list. Table 2 shows the skills
suggested by researchers which became the foundation for most aviation CRM training.
Table 2
Studies Defining Crew Resource Management Critical Skills
Orlady & Foushee
(1987)

Helmreich & Foushee
(1993)

Prince & Salas
(1993)

Communication

Communication

Communication

Problem-solving
Decision-making
Judgment

Decision tasks

Decision making

Leadership/Followership

Team formation

Leadership

Interpersonal skills

Management tasks

Assertiveness

Situation Awareness

Situation Awareness

Situation Awareness

Critique

Workload management
tasks

Mission Analysis

Stress management

Adaptability

Similar to commercial aviation, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force researchers
began defining CRM critical skills in the early 1990s (O’Conner et al., 2010). According
to O’Conner et al., United States military CRM training focuses on skills relevant to
military flight operation demands, and those defined skills have become the groundwork
for military services throughout the world.
Though the CRM critical skills are highly similar, each program is unique to
requirements for the particular service. Table 3 shows the CRM critical skills currently
trained for the U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
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Table 3
CRM Critical Skills in U.S. Military Services
U.S. Navy

U.S. Army

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Coast Guard

Communication

Communication

Communication

Communication

Decision making

Decision making Risk Management

Decision making

Leadership

Team leadership

Task Management

Cockpit Hazards

Assertiveness

Assertiveness

Crew/Flight
Coordination

Assertiveness

Situation
Awareness

Situation
Awareness

Situation
Awareness

Situation Awareness

Mission Analysis

Pre-mission
planning

Mission Analysis

Risk Management

Adaptability

Cockpit Automation
Flight Physiology

Though CRM training is well rooted in United States military aviation training
today, with the exception of aspects of threat and error management (Helmreich et al.,
1999; Helmreich & Merritt, 2000), the critical skills identified in the early 1990s are still
taught to military aviators. Military CRM experts believe that identified CRM critical
skills have remained relatively unchanged since the beginning (R. G. Hahn, personal
communication, October 6, 2013).
Teamwork
Teamwork is a major contributor to business organizational goals and process
improvement (Swanson & Holton, 2009). According to Salas (2005), 80% of today’s
workers are part of some type of work team within their organization. Industry
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globalization, emerging technology and safety issues demand that teams operate
effectively in competitive environments (Salas, 2005). In addition, high-risk complex
environments require flexibility and responsiveness among individual experts/specialists
operating in teams (Flin et al., 2008).
As sociotechnical systems become increasingly complex and produce conditions
for human error, teamwork within the system and the role of each team member is
essential (Fraher, 2011). Researchers investigating the role of individual skills on team
performance believe that individual task proficiencies alone are not sufficient to ensure
effectiveness team performance (Delise, Gorman, Brooks, Rentsch, & Steele-Johnson,
2010; Salas, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994).
Successful team performance requires a specific set of knowledge, skills, and attitudes
(KSAs) at the team level for successful mission completion (Oser, et al., 2000). Delise et
al. (2010) argue that team members must develop teamwork skills including
understanding the unique roles performed by each member of the team and the
interdependencies of those roles.
Team Processes
Wilson et al. (2007) believe that teamwork skills are cyclical in nature and act as
processes, outcomes, and processes again. Wilson et al. further suggest, “what serves as
an outcome of one variable may serve as an input to another” (p. 247). Marks et al.
(2001) describe teamwork skills as processes in which team members’ interdependent
actions change inputs to outcomes through verbal, cognitive, and behavioral activities.
Team processes are important because they define how team contributions transform into
performance outcomes (Mathieu et al., 2008). Team processes describe the types of
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interaction that take place among the team’s members (Marks et al., 2001). Researchers
(Flin et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2007) believe that communication is a teamwork process.
Verbal communication is the primary way team processes manifest (Fraher, 2011;
Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). According to Flin et al., safety, productivity, quality, and
job satisfaction are examples of team outcomes.
Team CRM processes
According to Flin et al. (2008), CRM training is a team-based strategy for helping
individuals be more effective in team processes. Salas et al. (2006a) believe that pilot
training of team-based processes must go beyond individual skills and include how to use
those team-based processes to improve team performance and safety. Researchers (Flin
et al., 2008; Kanki et al., 2010; Salas et al., 2006a) agree with earlier defined CRM
teamwork processes of communication, leadership, decision-making, mission
analysis/planning, and assertiveness but now recognize the team process of shared
situation awareness through shared mental models and the team process of monitoring
and backup behaviors.
Mental Models
Contemporary human-machine systems research has explored the role of
individual mental models in human behavior and performance. Realizing the
nontransparent black box understanding of human mental models, Rouse and Morris
(1985) propose, “mental models are the mechanisms whereby humans are able to
generate descriptions of system purpose and form explanations of system functioning and
observed system states, and predictions of future system states” (p. 7). Agreeing with
Rouse and Morris, Burns (2000) argues that mental models are adaptive belief constructs
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that are used to describe, explain and forecast situations. Rouse and Morris (1985)
believe that the successful search for mental models can result in substantial impacts to
system design and training.
Active mental models are important because they shape how we act toward
people or situations and affect what we see, and proper use of mental models can make
the difference between success and failure (Senge, 1990). In management, proper mental
models help organizations make good strategic business decisions which can achieve and
enhance their competitive advantage. Marsick and Watkins (1994) state that mental
models are “deeply held cognitive, value-based, feeling-fraught frameworks people use to
interpret situations they encounter [and that] people may or may not be aware of the
models they use, let alone learn to test them” (p. 356). Marsick and Watkins further
argue that new mental models are needed for today’s business environment for work
teams to innovate and retain the competitive edge.
A mental model is a symbolic portrayal of conceptual information that exists
within memory (Salas et al., 1995). Mental models allow individuals to draw inferences,
understand phenomena, and dictate action decisions (Mathieu et al., 2000). Mental
models construct expectations for the future by describing, explaining, and predicting
events (Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000). Senge (1990) suggests that Schon’s
(1983) reflective practice, i.e., the art of reflecting on one’s thinking, is a pragmatic
example of a mental model. Langan-Fox, Anglim, and Wilson (2004) describe mental
models as simulations “run to produce qualitative and quantitative inferences, [which]
underpin our understanding of a system, and allow us to describe, predict, and explain
behavior of a system” (p. 334). Researchers (Bjorklund, Alfredson, & Dekker, 2006;
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Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997) believe that in aviation, cockpit flight crewmembers use
mental models for scanning cockpit instruments, monitoring aircraft automation, and
establishing accurate expectations of the behavior of aircraft systems.
Shared Mental Models
Scientists now recognize that cognition is a social phenomenon and that
individuals construct their reality cooperatively in a social environment (Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994). A shared cognition construct among team members is the shared
mental model (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed,
1994). Mathieu et al. (2005) define a shared mental model as an “organized
understanding or mental representation of knowledge that is shared by team members”
(p. 38). The shared mental model construct is also known as team member schema
agreement (Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001), shared cognition (Cannon-Bowers & Salas,
2001), team mental model (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mohammed, Ferzandi, &
Hamilton, 2010), team mutual awareness (MacMillan, Paley, Entin, & Entin, 2005),
shared situation model (Orasanu, 1990, 2010), shared mindfulness (Krieger, 2005), and
shared situational awareness (Salas et al., 2006b).
Team members must explain and forecast the actions of other team members and
use shared mental models to do so (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1990; CannonBowers et al., 1993). Scientists believe there is a positive relationship between shared
mental models and team processes and performance (e.g., Marks et al., 2002; Marks et
al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001; SmithJentsch et al., 2005; Waller et al., 2004; Zou & Lee, 2010). Developing shared mental
models can improve the team’s ability to coordinate efforts, adapt to changing situations,
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and predict the needs of other team members (Flin et al., 2008). Shared mental models
help team members share an understanding of the situation, and a common understanding
of task responsibilities and task information requirements (Stout et al., 1999). Shared
mental models create an environment in which team members anticipate and foresee the
needs of the other team members (Orasanu, 1994; Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, &
Howse, 2006b; Stout et al., 1999). Wilson et al. (2007) argue that team coordination
breakdowns and teams not sharing a common understanding of the situation lead to errors
and missed steps or procedures. On the other hand, team coordination mechanisms
fostering shared cognition reduce the risk of errors and maintain or improve performance
(Wilson et al., 2007).
In training, developing accurate mental models improves performance outcomes.
According to Johnson, Khalil, and Spector (2008), greater shared mental models translate
into greater team capabilities, and team communication mediates the process of
developing shared mental models. Scientists found that in the naturalistic team setting of
FAA Air Traffic Control towers, shared mental models facilitate teamwork (SmithJentsch et al., 2005; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2009).
So what is “Shared” in Shared Mental Models?
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) argue that the term shared in team mental
models “can refer to a cognitive representation that is identical among team members
(e.g. common knowledge), a distributed configuration of representations (no overlap), or
to a configuration of overlapping representations among group members” (p. 421).
According to Mathieu et al. (2005), mental model “sharedness” is the consistency
between individual member mental models and models with other team members.
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Mathieu et al. (2005) argue, “there is no ‘team model’ per se,” only individual mental
models that are shared in a team (p. 38). Sharedness is not aggregating individuals’
models to a team model but instead a merging that represents individuals sharing a
common knowledge structures.
Mohammed et al. (2010) believe that the organization of shared knowledge
structures among team members remains at the core of the shared mental model construct
and point to various terms used to describe sharedness including similarity, convergence,
agreement, consensus, commonality, compatibility, overlap, and consistency. CannonBowers et al. (1993) believe that most of time what is shared regarding team mental
models is task dependent. However, during dynamic situations requiring high levels of
flexibility and adaptability, what is common among team members is each team
member’s function to the team task (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).
Research supports the existence of both task and team shared mental models
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu et al., 2005;
Mathieu et al., 2000). Task mental models represent what needs to be accomplished and
include work goals and performance requirements whereas team mental models are how
the work is accomplished among the team (Marks et al., 2001; Mohammed et al., 2010).
Though team mental models focus on the team member’s interpersonal interaction
requirements, task work mental models relate to team processes and team performance
outcomes (Lim & Klein, 2006; Mathieu et al., 2005).
Mohammed et al. (2010) argue that task and team mental model categories may
be too generic to describe content-specific knowledge requirements adequately. Recent
team research on military helicopter flight crews indicates that team shared mental
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models are best explained as complementing each other. Sperling and Pritchett (2011)
argue,
the measure of a shared mental model is not whether each team member’s mental
model is similar to each other’s, but rather whether each one’s mental model
corresponds to the individuals’ tasks and collectively are complementary, with
each team member knowing which information is known by the other team
member should he or she need to seek it, and which information is needed from
them to other team members and when. (p. 395)
Whether shared mental models between team members are described as similar,
common, task-related, team-related, or complementary, the critical inference is that teams
possess shared mental models that lead to common expectations and allow team members
to anticipate the needs of other team members and respond when appropriate and
necessary.
Shared Mental Models in High Tempo and Dynamic Environments
Flin et al. (2008) believe that teams working under high levels of workload and in
dynamic environments are able to coordinate and adapt to changing demands using
shared mental models. Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggest that high-performing teams use
shared mental models to anticipate the situation developments and the needs of other
team members when timely, error-free, and clear information is critical. Entin and
Serfaty (1999) further state that effective teams use implicit coordination strategies
during high-stress situations and that “shared mental models are useful constructs to
explain the anticipatory behavior of team members in the absence of scarcity of
communications” (p. 313). Accurate mental representations are critical to a team’s
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ability to adapt and respond to changing situations in highly complex, hazardous, and
stressful situations (Salas et al., 2008; Wildman et al., 2012). According to Espevik,
Johnsen, and Eid (2011), shared mental models allow teams the flexibility to shift
knowledge structures accurately in response to novel situations in high-intensity
situations.
The Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) research program
members, commencing after the 1998 downing of an Iranian commercial aircraft by
U.S.S. Vincennes, attempted to address team coordination and decision making under the
high operational tempos, short decision times, and ambiguous information conditions
(Espevik, Johnsen, Eid, & Thayer, 2006). By comparing errors between expert and
novice teams, TADMUS researchers found that high sharing mental model teams (a) are
more accurate in predicting actions of teammates, (b) require less overt planning, (c)
spend less time communicating, (d) make fewer requests for repeat information, (e) have
better sequencing of activities, and (f) are more resilient to the effects of stress (Espevik
et al., 2006). The findings of the multi-year, multi-million dollar TADMUS research
program led to advances in team training interventions such as mental model training
(Beaubien, Baker, & Holtzman, 2003).
Team Adaptability and Communication through Shared Mental Models
In highly dynamic environments, shared mental models provide a common
framework for teams to respond and adapt to situations requiring unfamiliar and
unexpected performance (Marks et al., 2000). Martin-Milham and Fiore (2005) believe a
critical component of shared cognition is the team’s ability both “assess risk and the time
available for decisions and…to construct a mental picture of the operational
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environment” (p. 55-1). Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall (2006) offer that team
adaptability is not possible without shared mental models because “members do not have
compatible views of equipment, tasks, and team member roles and responsibilities, which
allow members to adapt proactively” (p. 1194).
Flin et al. (2008) suggest that teams use the process of communication to develop
shared mental models when operating in situations that require team decision-making. In
a low-fidelity tank simulation study of 79 three-member tank platoon teams formed by
undergraduates of a large mid-Atlantic university, Marks et al. (2000) found that leader
briefings influenced the development of team shared mental models which in turn
positively affected team communication processes and team performance. Salas, Rosen,
et al. (2006) suggest that expert teams hold shared mental models allowing them to
anticipate the needs of each other and coordinate their actions without overt
communication.
Shared Mental Models in Aircraft Cockpits
Grote et al. (2010) believe cockpit crew effectiveness increases when using
adaptive coordination based on actions or responses emerging from shared mental
models. Orasanu’s (1990) seminal research explores cockpit team communication and
the role of shared mental models and planning. Oransanu (1990) found that during
increased workloads, cockpit crewmembers increase the amount of information while
cockpit team leaders reduce the number of requests for information, thus suggesting a
type of implicit coordination with the use of accurate shared mental models. Burke et al.
(2006) state that implicit coordination “requires that [team] members draw from their
shared mental models to anticipate and meet the needs of their teammates without being
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asked” (p. 1197). Krieger (2005) believes that communication and interpersonal
interaction are significant factors in human error in aviation and suggests that shared
mindfulness among flight crew is necessary in improving team effectiveness. Suggesting
a communicative interaction that is conjointly-achieved, Krieger (2005) found that shared
mindfulness allows cockpit team members to actively attend to, respond to, and perceive
information and make decisions.
Flight crew coordination and performance in the cockpit are two central concepts
in CRM, and the foundation for effective crew coordination and performance among
flight crewmembers is shared mental models (FAA, 2003). Researchers (Grote et al.,
2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011) believe that shared
mental models can enhance crew coordination in the multipiloted cockpits. Endsley
(2010) further recognizes the link between shared mental models in flight crew
performance by suggesting that the CRM crew behaviors improve situation awareness
indirectly through the development of shared mental models. According to Robertson &
Endsley (1995), flight crewmembers use a crew briefing and prior planning to establish
shared mental models. Those shared mental models allow flight crewmembers to predict
how others will act, thus forming the basis for Level 3 situational awareness (projection
of future status) and producing more efficient cockpit crews.
Shared mental models in Coast Guard aviation
The Coast Guard recently began introducing the concept of shared mental
models in aircraft cockpits. The author of Commandant Instruction M3710.1G, Air
Operations Manual provides guidance on the use of standard phraseology and notes that
flight crews should "announce any changes in speed, altitude, flight path, configuration,
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or any other changes that affect the crew's shared mental model" (U.S. Coast Guard,
2013, p. 4-2). The Air Operations Manual further outlines standard phraseology for pilot
flying and pilot monitoring during critical phases of flight, e.g. takeoffs, landings, to
promote effective communication and reduce flight crew workload. Coast Guard Office
of Aviation Forces, Fixed Wing & Sensors Division Chief iterates the importance of
shared mental models in Coast Guard cockpits: shared mental models shape how flight
crews think and interact and represent an aspect of cockpit flight discipline. If Coast
Guard flight crews are not thinking the same thing when interacting in the cockpit, there
is a problem (P. Beavis, personal communication, August 10, 2013).
Monitoring and Backup Behaviors
According to Salas, Rosen et al. (2006),
shared cognition, in the form of compatible [shared] mental models, as well as
mutual performance monitoring are necessary precursors to effective team
processes, such as back-up behavior, because they form the foundation for
decisions of when a team member must step in to provide backup, who should
step in, and what assistance is needed. (p. 443)
Burke et al. (2006) define mutual performance monitoring as a “cognitive action in which
team members regularly observe the actions of their teammates and watch for mistakes,
slips, lapses, errors, and performance discrepancies in an effort to catch and correct them
in a timely manner” (p. 1195). Marks et al. (2001) suggest that team members provide
monitoring and backup behavior by (a) providing verbal feedback or coaching, (b)
supporting in carrying out actions, or (c) assuming and completing a task for a team
member. Feedback to other team members can be verbal suggestions and/or corrective

61
behaviors, but the ultimate goal is assisting the team member in getting his or her
performance back on track (Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997). According to Marks et al.
(2002), mutual performance monitoring and backup are empirically derived team
coordination skills which significantly contribute to team shared cognition and manifest
through observable behaviors.
Marks et al. (2002) state that backup behavior is an important teamwork process
and define it as assisting team members in performing of tasks and recognize the
criticality of backup behavior during challenging, highly interdependent, time-critical
situations in which mistakes can jeopardize team success. Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen,
Ellis, and West (2003) have defined backup behaviors in the following way:
The discretionary provision of resources and task-related effort to another
member of one’s team that is intended to help that team member obtain the goals
as defined by his or her role when it is apparent that the team member is failing to
reach those goals. (p. 391)
Porter et al. argue that effective backup behaviors require that team members to have an
understanding of each other’s responsibilities and be both willing and able to provide and
seek support when needed. Furthermore, researchers (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009) suggest
that team members with more experience working together request and accept more
backup from each other and that requesting and accepting backup increases with
teammates’ familiarity. Wilson et al. (2010) suggest that teams reduce the risk of errors
and maintain performance with the following mechanisms:
1. share knowledge of the team, task and environment;
2. ask for assistance or assist others when overloaded;
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3. monitor each other’s performance to identify deficiencies and provide
assistance; and
4. maintain vigilance so as to adapt as the situation deems necessary. (p. 249)
Salas et al. (2005) believe that monitoring and backup behaviors are closely associated
with the shared mental models and suggest the following team research propositions:
1. “Mutual performance monitoring affects team effectiveness through effective
backup behavior” (p. 576).
2. “Effective mutual performance monitoring will only occur in teams with
adequate shared mental models and a climate of trust” (p. 577).
3. “Effective backup behavior requires the existence of adequate shared mental
models and mutual performance monitoring” (p. 580).
Monitoring and Backup Behavior among Flight Crewmembers
In multipiloted aircraft, mutual monitoring of the other pilot’s actions and tasks is
essential for team coordination and effectiveness (Tullo, 2010). Marks et al. (2001)
believe that cockpit flight crewmembers use monitoring and backup behavior and render
assistance when and if required to assist each other. Marks et al. (2001) suggest that
monitoring and backup behavior compensates for lapses in judgment or oversight made
by the other flight crewmembers. When flying, pilots monitor the aircraft’s course,
configuration, and systems and in multipiloted aircraft cockpits, each other (Dismukes &
Berman, 2010). Potter, Blickensderfer, and Boquet (2014) believe that pilot monitoring
is a cognitive strategy involving scanning and processing of both aircraft systems and the
actions of the other pilot to determine the allocation of attention resources to areas of
need.
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The concept of pilot monitoring is redefining the primary role differences
between the pilot manipulating (or managing in the case of autopilot and flight director
systems) the aircraft flight controls and the pilot not flying. Citing accident reports by
aviation safety organizations, Dismukes and Berman (2010) state that “lapses in
monitoring have played a role in many aviation accidents” and suggest that since
monitoring is often occurring concurrently with other tasks (e.g. communicating, tuning,
setting), pilots mistakenly believe that monitoring is secondary to those other tasks.
Aviation analyses show that most of the human errors detected in aviation are detected by
crewmembers not making the errors and that pilot monitoring is “a valuable source in
detecting mistakes of other team members” (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009, p. 694).
Pilots monitoring each other in multipiloted cockpits is essential to flight safety and serve
as the final defense against cockpit threats and errors (Potter et al., 2014).
The FAA (2003) revised Advisory Standard Operating Procedures for Flight
Deck Crewmembers recognizing the primary role of the non-flying pilot, acknowledging
that “it makes better sense to characterize pilots by what they are doing rather than by
what they are not doing,” and further suggesting that pilot monitoring is now widely
accepted as a more accurate term to describe that pilot not flying (p. 1). The FAA (2003)
identifies the division of duties and responsibilities of pilot flying and pilot monitoring
and monitoring/cross-checking as flight deck discipline and states, “effective monitoring
and cross-checking can be the last barrier or line of defense against accidents because
detecting an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events leading to an
accident” (Appendix 19, p. 1).
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Commercial and military aviation organizations recognize the role of monitoring
as a primary and shared responsibility of flight crewmembers and, following the FAA’s
guidance, now label the pilot not actually flying the aircraft as pilot monitoring. Tullo
(2010) argues that pilots should practice and evaluate the skill of monitoring. Tullo
further argues that when pilot training occurs in multipiloted aircraft, the emphasis of the
pilot not flying is monitoring. Tullo believes doing so will reinforce the primary role of
the pilot monitoring and de-emphasize individual performance, thus focusing it on the
team performance.
Monitoring and Backup Behavior and Cockpit Automation
Cockpit automation is the execution of a task, function, or service by an
automated system such as an autopilot, a flight director system, or a flight management
system. Cockpit automation can manage aircraft navigation, manipulate aircraft flight
controls and engine power, and monitor aircraft systems (Dismukes et al., 2007; Mouloua
et al., 2010). Pilots use cockpit automation for more precise flying and aircraft systems
monitoring than flying without automation (Reising, Liggett, & Munns, 1999 ; Wiener,
1988). Mouloua et al. (2010) point to growing empirical evidence on the negative effects
of cockpit automation. According to Mouloua et al., when aircraft are controlled by
highly reliable cockpit automated systems such as autopilot, flight director system, and
flight management system, a pilot’s ability to monitor the aircraft is affected.
Researchers found that cockpit automation can lead to poor human-monitoring
performance (Casner & Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies &
Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). Dismukes et al. (2007) suggest that
degraded pilot monitoring abilities associated with cockpit automation are rooted in basic
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human cognitive vulnerabilities. Tesmer (2010) believes the biggest downside to cockpit
automation is its inability to discern the flight crew intent. Tesmer argues that cockpit
automation tasks must verbalize, verify, and monitor between pilots in multipiloted
cockpits to increase automation awareness.
The crash of Air France Flight 447 in the Atlantic Ocean while en route from Rio
de Janeiro to Paris represents a salient example of negative effects of advanced cockpit
automation and the flight crew’s inability to monitor the aircraft and each other at the
same time. According to Langewiesche (2014), the pilot monitoring the pilot flying
became so distracted with interpreting cockpit automation indications that he abandoned
his primary role of monitoring the actions of the pilot flying. Cockpit automation also
caused both pilots to control the aircraft simultaneously without knowing the flight
control inputs of the other pilot, further confusing predefined pilot flying and pilot
monitoring roles and responsibilities. Langewiesche (2014) believes cockpit automation
led to basic communication and coordination difficulties at a time when the Air France
cockpit flight crew needed them the most. The interplay of cockpit automation and CRM
was not fully understood until after the recovery of the aircraft flight data recorders and
crash investigation. Langewiesche (2014) believes that the Air France crash “stands out
as the most perplexing and significant airline accident of modern times” (p. 258).
Monitoring and Backup Behavior in Coast Guard Cockpits
Following the commercial aviation industry, the Coast Guard aviation leaders
recognize pilot monitoring and backup behaviors and are clarifying the focus of the pilot
not operating the aircraft flight controls. Recent air operations policy guidance now
utilizes the term pilot monitoring interchangeably with legacy terms such as safety pilot
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(U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Fixed-wing aircraft communities in the Coast Guard (e.g. HC144, HC-130J) use the term pilot monitoring. The HC-144A Aircraft Flight Manual
specifically states that the “duties of the [pilot flying] and [pilot monitoring] shall be
divided to provide the highest levels of situational awareness and…CRM” (U.S. Coast
Guard, 2011b, p. 2A-4). Coast Guard rotary-wing aircraft communities define the role of
pilot monitoring and emphasize that the pilots monitoring should provide backup to the
pilot flying (U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a; U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b). For both fixed wing
and rotary wing aircraft, the Coast Guard Air Operations Manual defines pilot
monitoring communication protocol when using cockpit automation equipment (U.S.
Coast Guard, 2013). In Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits, the overall goal of the pilot
not flying is to monitor the completion of all procedures and to provide back up to the
other member of the flight crew (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).
Chapter Summary
The Coast Guard continues to look for ways to operate aircraft safely and
effectively but recent aircraft accidents require a fresh look at flight safety in Coast Guard
aviation. Concerns by aviation leadership about the use of and effectiveness of CRM
among flight crews led to changes in delivery method and evaluation, but human error
continues in Coast Guard cockpits. However, human error in the cockpit is not new in
aviation. Commercial and military CRM training is a direct result of efforts to reduce
human error in the cockpit and improve coordination and communication among cockpit
crewmembers. As new research in the psychosocial aspects of flight crew interaction
continues to influence the focus of CRM, new CRM skills are emerging. Teamwork
skills and outcomes indicate the role and impact of shared cognition among flight
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crewmembers. Similar to advanced aircraft systems with multiple redundancies for
added protection for increase safety, multipiloted aircraft provide a human redundancy
designed to provide mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between
pilots, increasing cockpit team effectiveness. Coast Guard CRM must move toward
leveraging multipiloted human redundancy behaviors and training team skills that both
create and enhance safety in multipiloted cockpits.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Commercial and military aviation CRM attempts to increase flight crew
effectiveness by improving cockpit teamwork processes. Recent Coast Guard aircraft
mishaps costing lives and millions of dollars indicate a need for a better understanding of
shared mental models and their role in cockpit flight crew team coordination CRM skills.
The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental
model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or manual),
and cockpit flight crew total flight time on ITO maneuver mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors. In this chapter, the researcher describes the study’s
population and sample, research design including study variables, researcher-designed
instruments used in the study, internal and external validity threats, Institutional Review
Board approval procedures, and data collection procedures.
Research Objectives (RO)
The research objectives of the study are as follows:
RO1: Describe the demographics of the study population according to pilot
designation/qualification and cockpit flight crew total flight time experience.
RO2: Determine the level of mental model sharedness in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight
crews of ITO maneuver critical team tasks.
RO3: Determine the relationship between the ITO maneuver shared mental model score
and observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews.
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RO4: Compare the type of instrument takeoff (coupled or manual) on observed levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit
flight crews.
RO5: Determine the relationship between flight crew total flight time and observed
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft
cockpit flight crews.
RO6: Determine the combined interaction effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental
model score, ITO type, and flight crew total flight time on observed levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit
flight crews.
Population and Sample
The population of the study was Coast Guard pilots who fly the MH-65 aircraft.
Approximately 430 pilots fly the MH-65 at 19 Coast Guard Air Stations across the
country (K. Barres, personal communication October 15, 2013). The MH-65 pilots have
completed initial military flight training and are currently trained to fly the MH-65
aircraft. The pilots are assigned specific designations based on training and aviation
experience as one of the following (ranked from lowest to highest): 1) copilot, 2) first
pilot, and 3) aircraft commander. According to U.S. Coast Guard (2013), each pilot
designation represents specific roles and responsibilities within the aircraft cockpit and
certifies the pilot has gained a specific level of training and experience to safely fly the
aircraft in day and night during all weather conditions.
The copilot designation is for pilots initially trained in the MH-65 aircraft who
have demonstrated aircraft systems and emergency procedures knowledge,
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communications and security procedures, Federal Aviation Regulations, and FAA
policies and procedures. The copilot designation is for pilots holding a military pilot
rating (military aviator) but lack Coast Guard mission and operational experience (U.S.
Coast Guard, 2013). The first pilot and aircraft commander designations are for pilots
who possess higher levels of aircraft experience and Coast Guard operational experience
and can function as pilot in command. Pilots functioning as pilot in command are
ultimately responsible for the safe, orderly, efficient, and effective performance of the
flight and mission completion (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Though both first pilot and
aircraft commander designations can function as pilot in command, the aircraft
commander designation is for pilots who have demonstrated higher levels of aviation
judgment, flight discipline, aircrew supervision, and the use of cockpit CRM principles.
In addition to the three pilot designations, some pilots are also qualified as
instructor pilots, allowing them to perform formal instruction, evaluation, and
standardization (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). The instructor pilot qualification is in addition
to the aircraft commander designation and normally given to pilots who are highly
competent aircraft commanders. All instructor pilots are aircraft commanders, but not all
aircraft commanders are instructor pilots. Coast Guard instructor pilots must demonstrate
personal characteristics such as superior judgment, patience, discretion, a desire to
instruct, and the ability to inspire confidence and win respect (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).
Coast Guard instructor pilots are individually-selected and represent the highest level of
aviation experience and maturity among pilots. Instructor pilots are responsible for the
training and evaluation of all MH-65 pilots and the mentoring of less experienced pilots
in aviation decision making, judgment, leadership, and Coast Guard CRM tenets.
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Population Sample
According to Fink (2003), a convenience sample consists of individuals who are
willing to participate and easily available for sampling. Pilots attending their MH-65
Proficiency Simulator Course at ATC Mobile were invited to participate in the study.
The MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course is a weeklong training course required by all
MH-65 pilots on a 15-month recurrent cycle. The course provides a mechanism for
FAA-required pilot instrument checks and flight scenarios emphasizing aircraft
emergency procedures and critical flight maneuvers (Federal Aviation
Regulations/Aeronautical Information Manual, 2013; U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). The
MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course consists of both ground school and Operational
Flight Trainer (OFT) events. As seen in Table 4, there are four separate OFT events in a
week-long Proficiency Simulator Course (ranked in event order): 1) Emergency
Procedures 1, 2) Instrument Check 1, 3) Instrument Check 2, and 4) Emergency
Procedures 2. Instrument check OFT events assess pilot instrument flight planning
knowledge and abilities and in-flight instrument procedures. The emergency procedures
OFT events evaluate aircraft systems and emergency procedural knowledge.
Table 4
MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course OFT Events
OFT event 1

OFT event 2

OFT event 3

OFT event 4

Emergency
Procedures 1

Instrument
Check 1

Instrument
Check 2

Emergency
Procedures 2

Pilots attending the Proficiency Simulator Course are divided into two-pilot cockpit flight
crews and remain paired together for all four OFT events. Cockpit flight crew pairing
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promotes crew familiarity and allows the assessment of CRM skills between the two
pilots during the course. The study used the cockpit flight crews established by the MH65 Proficiency Simulator Course schedulers.
Research Design
A cross-sectional, descriptive, nonexperimental repeated measures design was
used in this study (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Data was collected during an
eleven-week period from June to August 2014 corresponding with MH-65 Proficiency
Simulator Course convenings. The availability of MH-65 instructor pilots at ATC
Mobile during summer transfer season and the maintenance upgrade of the MH-65 OFT
limited the data collection period to approximately three months. Thirty-three cockpit
flight crews participated, and all cockpit flight crews asked agreed to participate. Thirtythree cockpit flight crews participating closely matches the number of teams utilized in
past shared mental model research (Marks et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002; Mathieu et al.,
2005; Mathieu et al., 2005).
Instrument Takeoffs (ITOs)
The study consisted of cockpit flight crews flying ITOs (two per pilot) in the MH65 OFT. Pilots fly ITOs using cockpit flight instruments when visibility is poor and
insufficient references exist for visual takeoffs (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b). According to
the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b), two types of ITOs,
coupled and manual, are available for use by MH-65 cockpit flight crews during low
visibility conditions. A coupled ITO transitions the aircraft from hovering to a climb
using the flight director automated system. During a manual ITO, the pilot “manually”
flies the aircraft from hovering to a climb. The coupled ITO relies primarily on the
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cockpit automation to fly the aircraft. Both types of ITOs are acceptable methods for
safely climbing the helicopter away from the water in low visibility conditions following
overwater hover operations.
In May of 2012, a Coast Guard Transition Flight Working Group convened to
review rotary wing procedures associated with critical phases of low overwater helicopter
operations (D. Waters, personal communication, April 19, 2013). Several
recommendations made by the Coast Guard Transition Flight Working Group were
implemented to enhance safety and increase operational effectiveness of their helicopter
flight crews. Interim Change 5 of the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual, released in April of
2013, modified the procedures for coupled and manual ITOs, thereby enhancing safety
during low overwater helicopter operations. Safely flying the helicopter in low visibility
conditions following overwater hover operations remained the primary purpose of
coupled and manual ITOs, and the description of the maneuvers remained relatively
unchanged. However, Interim Change 5 standardized coupled and manual ITO briefing
items, delineated more specifically pilot flying duties and safety pilot duties, and
standardized cockpit flight crew verbal communication during the ITO maneuvers (see
Figure 3). The modified procedures were designed to increase cockpit flight crew
coordination by establishing specific guidelines on monitoring and backup behaviors of
the safety pilot during the ITO maneuvers. The coupled and manual ITO were chosen by
the researcher because of the critical nature of low overwater helicopter operations and
the importance of proper mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors by the
cockpit flight crews during ITO maneuvers.
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Figure 3. MH-65 Aircraft Coupled and Manual Instrument Takeoff (ITO) Procedures
Coupled and Manual Instrument Takeoff Procedures describing the maneuvers and
specific Pilot at the Controls and Safety Pilot cockpit tasks. Adapted from “Flight
Manual USCG Series HH-65C Helicopter, CGTO 1H-65C-1 (Interim Change 5).”
Washington, DC: Author. pp. 2-19, 20. Copyright 2010 by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Adapted with permission.
Research Design
In this repeated measures design study, cockpit flight crews flew four ITO
maneuvers (two coupled and two manual) in their Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event of
the MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course. According to Sprinthall (2012), a repeated
measures design allows the study subjects to be measured more than once, therefore
creating a within-subjects design. To determine the mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors between the two pilots during the climb away from the water in low
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visibility conditions, each pilot flew a coupled ITO and a manual ITO and then
functioned as safety pilot while the other pilot flew a coupled ITO and a manual ITO.
Pilots monitor aircraft systems and each other when operating the aircraft (Dismukes &
Berman, 2010; Marks et al., 2001; Potter et al., 2014; Tullo, 2010). A repeated measures
design was used to allow both pilots to be measured on monitoring and backing up as the
pilot flying and pilot monitoring during the ITOs.
Research Variables
There were three independent variables and one dependent variable used in the
study. The three independent variables were the ITO maneuver shared mental model
score, type of ITO being flown, and cockpit flight crew total flight time. The dependent
variable was the ITO maneuver monitoring/backup behavior score. The following is a
discussion of each variable and its purpose in the study.
ITO Maneuver Shared Mental Model Score
According to Stout et al. (1999), a shared mental model is a coordinating
mechanism for effective teamwork. Shared mental models can enhance crew
coordination and situational awareness in multipiloted cockpits (Endsley, 2010; Grote et
al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011). Marks et al.
(2000) classified the sharedness levels of mental models in cockpit flight crews as a
similarity index score. Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000) classified the
sharedness levels of mental models in cockpit flight crews as a centrality index score.
The sharedness score of Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and Mathieu et al.
(2000) indicated the influence of the shared mental model on cockpit flight crew
performance.
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Using the methodology found in Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and
Matheiu et al. (2000), the researcher determined a shared mental model score for each
cockpit flight crew indicating the level of mental model sharedness of the ITO
maneuvers. To determine the effect of flight crew shared mental model on mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors, the study used the cockpit flight crew
shared mental model score as an interval variable.
ITO Type (coupled or manual)
A coupled ITO transitions the aircraft to a climbout profile using a cockpit
automated system while the manual ITO involves the pilot “manually” hand-flying the
ITO flight climbout profile. Though both types of ITOs are designed to establish a
climbout profile when transitioning to forward flight following overwater hover
operations, the coupled ITO relies primarily on aircraft cockpit automation to fly the
maneuver. According to Dismukes & Berman (2010), flight crews monitor aircraft flight
instruments less when aircraft are controlled by highly reliable cockpit automated
systems when the probability for error is lower. However, it is unclear whether pilot
monitoring and backup of cockpit automation is similar to pilot monitoring and backup of
the other pilot in multipiloted cockpits. To determine the effect of cockpit automation on
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between MH-65 cockpit flight
crews, the study used ITO type (coupled or manual) as a nominal (categorical) variable.
Cockpit Flight Crew Total Flight Time
Flin et al. (2008) believe that level of experience, technical expertise, and
familiarity with situations influence decision-making. According to Prince, Salas,
Brannick, and Prince (2010), the interaction of pilots in multipiloted cockpits changes
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based on the experience level of the individual pilots. A pilot’s aviation judgment and
decision making increase with flying experience and maturity. The Coast Guard
recognizes that more experienced pilots, e.g. instructor pilots and aircraft commanders,
should possess higher degrees of judgment, flight discipline, and CRM skills (U.S. Coast
Guard, 2013).
In aviation, one indicator of experience and maturity is pilot total hours. In both
commercial and military aviation, total pilot time is an industry-standard indication for
flight experience, aviation discipline, maturity, and decision-making. Total pilot time is
used as a discriminator in pilot hiring decisions. However, total pilot time as an
experience indicator varies among aviation industry sectors, e.g. general aviation or
airline transport aviation. Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) classify a general aviation
novice pilot as having accumulated less than 1,000 flight hours and an expert pilot as
having more than 1,000 flight hours. Studying the role of flight hours and cockpit flight
crew performance, Todd and Thomas (2012) classify airline transport first officers with
less than 1,500 flight hours as low time pilots and first officers with more than 1,500
flight hours as high time pilots. Airline captains with less than 5,000 flight hours are
considered low flight time captains, and captains with more than 5,000 are high time
captains (Todd & Thomas, 2012).
Coast Guard pilots are normally initially designated in aircraft type with as little
as 200 total flight hours. The designations of first pilot and aircraft commander require a
minimum of 500 and 700 total flight hours, respectively (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). The
Coast Guard Air Operations Manual encourages Coast Guard pilots to accumulate 20-25
flight hours per month to maintain aviation proficiency and to reduce operational risks
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(U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Coast Guard first pilots and aircraft commanders are required
to fly a minimum of 96 flight hours a year (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013) but normally can
acquire 200 to 400 flight hours a year. According to Prince et al. (2010), cockpit flight
crews communicate differently based on each pilot’s experience and maturity. However,
it is unclear whether cockpit flight crew aviation experience and maturity level,
quantified in total flight time, affects cockpit flight crew mutual performance monitoring
and backup behaviors. To gauge the overall experience and maturity level of the
participating cockpit flight crews, the researcher combined the total flight hours of each
cockpit flight crew (two pilots) to create a cockpit total flight time interval variable.
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behavior Score
Research shows that monitoring is the act of observing behaviors and actions of
other team members, thus allowing team members to identify mistakes and lapses in
behaviors and actions (Salas et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007). Backup behaviors occur
when team members help each other perform their roles, and research indicates the
positive effect between backup behaviors and team performance (Porter et al., 2003).
Derived from the team performance process analysis found in earlier shared mental
model research (Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu et al., 2005; Marks et al., 2002; Marks et
al., 2002), the levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of each
cockpit flight crew ITO maneuvers were judged to create a mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors score interval variable for each MH-65 cockpit flight
crew.

79
Instrumentation
Two researcher-designed data collection instruments were used in the study: 1)
Shared Mental Model Instrument, and 2) Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument. The
purpose of the Shared Mental Model Instrument was to determine the level of sharedness
of cockpit flight crews’ mental model regarding the coupled and manual ITO maneuvers
and to create a shared mental model score for each cockpit flight crew for later
comparison with ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
The purpose of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was to determine the level of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between each cockpit
flight crew during the coupled and manual ITOs and to create a coupled and manual ITO
score.
Shared Mental Model Instrument Development Background
The researcher-designed Shared Mental Model Instrument was derived from
earlier shared mental model instruments found in Marks et al. (2002), Mathieu et al.
(2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000) which identified critical team tasks across flight crew
team positions necessary for mission success. Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al.
(2000) identified critical team tasks of a two-person team flight crew flying an F-16 flight
simulator on a military mission (see Table 5). Marks et al. (2002) identified critical team
tasks of a three-person flight crew (pilot, gunner, and radar specialist) operating an
Apache attack helicopter flight simulator in battlefield attack missions (see Table 5). In
Mathieu et al. (2005) and Matheieu et al. (2000) as well as Marks et al. (2002), the
critical team tasks characterize a shared mental model which helped team members
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predict and describe who should do what at a particular point in time during the flight
missions to complete the assigned mission.
Table 5
Critical Team Tasks Identified to Complete the Mission
Mathieu et al. (2005)
Mathieu et al. (2000)
Diving/climbing

Marks et al.
(2002)
Escape enemy attacks

Banking/turning

Follow waypoints

Choosing airspeed

Identify enemy

Selecting and shooting weapons

Position helicopter for targeting

Reading/interpreting radar

Adjust speed

Intercepting the enemy

Fire weapons

Escaping the enemy

Announce enemy approach

Dispensing chaff and flares

Adjust altitude
Select target

After identifying the critical team tasks to successfully complete the mission,
Mathieu et al. (2005), Matheiu et al. (2000), and Marks et al. (2002) asked each member
of the flight crew to judge the relatedness of each team task to other identified team tasks
and assign a number ranging from 1 (not related) to 9 (very related). The team member
scores were fed into computer programs and compared to other team member scores to
determine a similarity index (Marks et al., 2000) or centrality index (Mathieu et al., 2005;
Mathieu et al., 2000) indicating a level of team mental model sharedness regarding
critical team tasks.
Shared Mental Model Instrument
The researcher conducted a team task analysis, based on a methodology described
in Burke (2005), of the MH-65 coupled and manual ITO procedures with an ATC Mobile
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instructor pilot. The analysis resulted in seven critical team tasks for ITO maneuvers
common to both the coupled and manual ITOs (see Table 6). The seven ITO maneuver
critical team tasks were placed both vertically and horizontally in the Shared Mental
Model Instrument, producing a grid-like format with empty boxes creating an intersection
between two ITO maneuver team tasks (see Appendix B). The grid-like format allowed
the recording of a related value between two ITO maneuver team tasks by each pilot of a
cockpit flight crew.
Table 6
Critical Team Tasks Identified to Complete an ITO Maneuver
Coupled ITO
Aligning maneuver expectations
(Departure Brief)

Manual ITO
Aligning maneuver expectations
(Departure Brief)

Establishing pre-ITO aircraft configuration Establishing pre-ITO aircraft configuration
Pilot at the controls & safety pilot verbal
call outs

Pilot at the controls & safety pilot verbal
call outs

Monitoring attitude, airspeed, & altitude

Monitoring attitude, airspeed, & altitude

Monitoring flight director for proper
control inputs

Monitoring flight director for proper
control inputs

Achieving desired level-off altitude

Achieving desired level-off altitude

Conducting level-off checklist

Conducting level-off checklist

Each pilot of the cockpit flight crew completed the Shared Mental Model
Instrument by judging the relatedness of each critical team task to another task and
choosing a value ranging from 1 (not related) to 5 (very related). The pilot recorded the
value of the two critical team tasks in each box intersecting of two critical team tasks (see
Appendix C for an example of a completed Shared Mental Model Instrument).
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The researcher compared the critical team task values recorded on each pilot’s
Shared Mental Model Instrument and created a shared mental model score for each
critical team task comparison. For example, if one pilot chose a value of 1, indicating a
low related value between two critical team tasks, and the other pilot chose 5, indicating a
high related value between two critical team tasks, the shared mental model score for this
two tasks comparison equaled 4. The critical team tasks shared mental model scores
were aggregated to produce a total shared mental score for each MH-65 cockpit flight
crew. A low shared mental score represented a high level of mental model sharedness for
the cockpit flight crew. The Shared Mental Model Instrument also captured study
participant pilot designation and total flight time descriptive statistics.
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Background
For cockpit flight crews, observable behaviors are specific actions employing
CRM skills in a given situation (FAA, 2006). The researcher-designed
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was derived from past CRM behavioral marker
instruments designed to capture and measure cockpit flight crew observable behaviors.
According to Flin and Martin (2001), behavioral markers have been used to represent a
prescribed set of behaviors leading to a performance aspect.
The Targeted Acceptable Responses to Generated Events or Tasks methodology
was used to evaluate team CRM performance by identifying events that elicit behaviors
of interest and then controlling the introduction of those events through an OFT in-flight
scenario script (Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz, & Oser, 1994). The goal of Targeted
Acceptable Responses to Generated Events or Tasks is minimizing observer judgments of
cockpit flight crew through the use of predefined set of acceptable behaviors (O’Conner,
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Hormann, Flin, Lodge, Goeters, & JARTEL Group, 2002). Non-Technical Skills is a
behavioral rating system to assess a pilot’s CRM non-technical skills. The framework of
Non-Technical Skills is intended to reduce ambiguities in evaluating pilot CRM skills
(Flin, 2010). The basic usability and psychometric properties of Non-Technical Skills
was tested within a consortium of European research centers and aviation companies.
The test consisted of eight recorded OFT airline transport operational scenarios, each
with a unique set of design references, reflecting pilot non-technical skills for behavior
categories (O’Conner et al., 2002). Instructors rated cockpit flight crew behaviors in each
scenario and judged predefined behaviors on a 5-point scale score form ranging from
very poor to very good (Flin, 2010).
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument
In order to determine the level of mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors during the coupled and manual ITOs flown by the cockpit flight crews, the
researcher-designed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument established scenario-based
predefined CRM behavior markers similar to Targeted Acceptable Responses to
Generated Events or Tasks and Non-Technical Skills. The behavior markers were
derived from mutual performance monitoring and backup statements and questions found
in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007; see Table 7) . The teamwork behavior
markers of Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007) were contextualized to the roles
and responsibilities of cockpit flight crews (pilot flying and pilot monitoring) during the
coupled and manual ITO maneuvers and captured as five mutual performance monitoring
and five backup behavior CRM behavior markers in the Monitoring/Backup Behavior
Instrument (see Appendix D). Each ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and
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backup behavior marker is scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great extent) in order
to rate the level of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of each cockpit
flight crew. The Likert rating scale used in the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument
is similar to the rating scale found in Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000).
Table 7
Teamwork Behavior Markers
Salas et al.
(2005)
Mutual Performance Monitoring
Identifying mistakes and lapses in other
team members’ actions.
Providing feedback regarding team
member actions to facilitate selfcorrection.

Wilson et al.
(2007)
Mutual Performance Monitoring
Did team members observe the
behaviors and actions of other team
members?
Did team members recognize mistakes
made recognize mistakes made by
others?
Were team members aware of their own
and others’ surroundings?

Backup Behavior

Backup Behavior

Recognition by potential backup
providers that there is a workload
distribution problem in the their team.

Did team members correct other team
members errors?

Shifting of work responsibilities to
underutilized team members.

Did team members provide and request
assistance when needed?

Completion of the whole task or parts of
tasks by other team members.

Did team members recognize when one
performed exceptionally well?

Monitoring/Backup Behavior Observation Methodology
To determine the mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors displayed
by the cockpit flight crews during the coupled and manual ITOs, two CRM SMEs viewed
the recorded ITO maneuvers on the Computer-Aided Debriefing Station and completed a
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument for each ITO maneuver (coupled and manual).
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The two CRM SMEs are highly experienced Coast Guard instructor pilots with over
15,000 combined flight hours and experts in multipiloted cockpit coordination and CRM
principles. The debriefing station used by the CRM SMEs is located in the pilots’
debriefing room at ATC Mobile and allows for over-the-shoulder video/audio recording
of the cockpit area and instrument panel and training event playback capability (see
Figure 4). The debriefing room is normally used for recording MH-65 Proficiency
Simulator Course OFT events. The CRM SMEs observing the recorded coupled and
manual ITOs knew the purpose and research objectives of the study but were unaware of
the shared mental model scoring of each cockpit flight crew while judging the mutual
performance monitoring and backup behavior levels.

Figure 4. Computer-Aided Debriefing Station Screen.
Instrumentation by Research Objective and Study Variables
The two researcher-designed data collection instruments explored the six research
objectives using the study’s three independent variables and one dependent variable. The
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Shared Mental Model Instrument was used for describing the demographics of the study
population according to pilot designation/qualification and obtaining the cockpit flight
crew total flight time experience (RO1). The Shared Mental Model Instrument also
determined the level of mental model sharedness of MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews
on ITO maneuver critical team tasks (RO2).
The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument captured the MH-65 cockpit flight
crews’ observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during
the coupled and manual ITOs and determined the relationship of those behaviors and ITO
maneuver shared mental model score (RO3), type of instrument takeoff (coupled or
manual (RO4), and flight crew total flight time (RO5). The data collection instruments
and their associated research objectives, independent variables, dependent variable, and
statistical analysis are seen in Figure 5.
Research
Objective

Data Collection

Variable

Variable

1

Shared Mental
Model Instrument

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mean & SD

Shared Mental Model
score

Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors

Correlation

ITO type
(coupled or manual)
IV

Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors
DV

T-test

Flight crew total flight
hours

Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors

Correlation

SMM score
ITO type
Flight crew total flight
hours
IVs

Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors
DV

ANCOVA

2
3

4

5

6

Shared Mental
Model Instrument
Monitoring/
Backup Behavior
Instrument
Monitoring/
Backup Behavior
Instrument
Monitoring/
Backup Behavior
Instrument
Monitoring/
Backup Behavior
Instrument

Statistical
Analysis
Descriptive/
Mean & SD

Figure 5. Data Collection, Variables, and Statistical Analysis by Research Objective.
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Instrument Validity and Reliability
According to Phillips and Phillips (2007), validity is the degree to which an
instrument measures what it is designed to measure, and reliability is the consistency of
the instrument over time. According to Hall and Brannick (2008), a major drawback
when using humans as judges is that judges may disagree with each other and interpret
differently what they observe. A validity threat to the study was interrater reliability
between the CRM SMEs judging mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors
when completing the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments on the recorded cockpit
flight crew ITO maneuvers. To increase the study’s construct validity, the CRM SME
raters received a one-hour training session on the use of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior
Instrument. The training included a review of mutual performance monitoring and
backup statements and questions found in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007) as
well as a review of the five mutual performance monitoring and five backup behavior
CRM behavior markers on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument.
Interrater reliability was tested between CRM SMEs judging mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors. The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument scores
were tested using Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r) to assess interrater
reliability between the two CRM SMEs judging the mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors. Pearson’s r is possible for interrater reliability when raters produce
raw scores (Huck, 2012) and is a popular statistic test for calculating the degree of
consistency among independent raters (Multon, 2010). Pearson’s r of .70 is an acceptable
level of reliability (Multon, 2010). Pearson’s r tests between the two CRM SMEs were
.44 and .29 for coupled and manual Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument scores
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respectively. A low Pearson’s r interrater reliability score between the two CRM SMEs
for coupled and manual scores possibly occurred as a result of the Monitoring/Backup
Behavior Instrument mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors scoring.
Additional threats to the CRM SME observations and the Monitoring/Backup
Behavior Instrument included observer errors of leniency and central tendency (Pershing
Warren, & Rowe, 2006). Errors of leniency occur when observers rate behaviors high
regardless of performance, and errors of central tendency occur when observers rate all
participants at the middle of the scale (Pershing et al., 2006). Defining flight crew
monitoring and backup observable behaviors and Likert scale levels during the CRM
SME training helped to decrease possible errors of leniency and central tendency. During
the CRM SME training, the researcher reviewed examples of low, medium, and high
levels of pilot monitoring behaviors and backup behaviors.
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Validity Threat
The 10 ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior
markers found on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument seen in Appendix D are
based on the teamwork behavior markers found in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al.
(2007). According to Phillips (1997), behavior markers are used for observing the
presence or absence and frequency of behaviors of study participants. The behaviors in
this study were the mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of the cockpit
flight crews during the coupled and manual ITOs. However, eight of the 10 ITO
maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior markers on the
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument require either cockpit flight crew flight control
mistakes, lapses in procedural steps, or ITO maneuver errors. If the flight crew did not
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make a mistake, lapse, or error, the mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior
became unmeasurable. For example, Behavior Marker 6 on the Monitoring/Backup
Behavior Instrument could not be judged by CRM SME observers if a flight control error
was not made by the pilot flying. In these instances, the CRM SMEs observing the
recorded cockpit flight crew ITO maneuvers noted the behavior marker as “not
applicable.” “Not applicable” behavior markers were removed from the total possible
score in an attempt to reduce observation instrument inaccuracy and maintain
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument validity. Therefore, each completed
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument final score was calculated only on the behavior
markers scored and not the 200 total possible points on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior
Instrument.
Threats to Internal and External Validity
The researcher considered threats to internal and external validity (Shadish et al.,
2002). The convenience sampling of 66 MH-65 pilots forming 33 MH-65 cockpit flight
crews presented an internal validity threat to the study. Since a random sampling of all
Coast Guard MH-65 pilots located across the United States and Puerto Rico was cost
prohibitive, the convenience sample of 66 MH-65 pilots (33 MH-65 cockpit flight crews)
attending their annual MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course was deemed acceptable to
the researcher. To moderate the convenience sampling validity threat of the study, the
researcher reviewed the designation and experience level pairing of each cockpit flight
crew to ensure the pairing closely matched that normally occurring in MH-65 aircraft
cockpits at Coast Guard Air Stations. Cockpit flight crew designation pairings and
experience levels are reported in Chapter IV.
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The recent changes to the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual regarding coupled and
manual ITO maneuvers represented a history threat to the study. Since all MH-65
cockpit flight crews had been trained and evaluated on the new ITO maneuver
procedures, there was a reasonable expectation that flight crews were familiar and
proficient in the ITO modified procedures. To increase internal validity, all participating
flight crews were advised of the upcoming ITO maneuvers when signing their informed
consent forms allowing them to review the ITO maneuver procedures prior to their
Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.
To reduce the testing effect of the ITO maneuver repeated measures data
collection, the researcher used a Latin Square design to counterbalance the four recorded
ITO maneuvers in the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event. The repeated measures
allowed both pilots to be measured in pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles. The Latin
Square design determined ITO type, order of ITOs, and flight crew duties by seat position
for each cockpit flight crew (see Appendix E). To ensure the four ITO maneuvers were
conducted similarly for each cockpit flight crew, each ATC Mobile instructor pilot
conducting the ITO maneuvers was given a job aid outlining the Latin Square design to
be used for their particular Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.
External validity refers to the ability to apply the study to other settings and
populations (Sprinthall, 2012). The study’s setting was in the Coast Guard’s MH-65D
OFT. According to Moroney and Moroney (2010), OFTs are a valid representation of
aircraft flight and system characteristics. Commercial and military aviation use OFTs
extensively for flight crew training and to create dynamic real-world situations to
measure cockpit flight crew effectiveness and performance (Salas & Preist, 2005).
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According to the Civil Aviation Authority (2006), OFTs allow crews to practice CRM
behaviors under normal and emergency conditions. Fowlkes et al. (1994) used OFT inflight scenarios to evaluate team CRM performance. Dismukes (2009) argues that fullmission flight simulation (OFTs) allow for ethnographic observation and laboratory
experimentation when studying the expert performance of real world tasks. Given past
CRM research using OFTs (Fowlkes et al., 1994; O’Conner et al., 2002; Potter et al.,
2014), the researcher believes that this study’s findings on cockpit flight crew mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors may be applicable to monitoring and
backup behaviors found in other Coast Guard and United States military multipiloted
cockpits.
Institutional Review Board Approval
The researcher submitted the data collection instruments (Shared Mental Model
Instrument and Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument), data collection plan, and study
participant consent form to The University of Southern Mississippi Institution Review
Board (IRB) for human subject review and approval (The University of Southern
Mississippi Institutional Review Board website, n.d). Following research approval by
The University of Southern Mississippi (see Appendix F), similar human subjects
research forms were submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard IRB for human subject review
and approval (U.S. Coast Guard, 2011a). U.S. Coast Guard IRB approval was granted
approximately one month later (Appendix G). Both IRB reviews were necessary to
ensure the proposed research met the relevant federal and institutional standards and the
ethical treatment and well-being of those participating in the study. The Coast Guard’s
IRB recognized the primary oversight of The University of Southern Mississippi’s IRB.
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Data Collection Procedures
Data collection began immediately following The University of Southern
Mississippi and U.S. Coast Guard IRB approval. The MH-65 Proficiency Simulator
Course convened each Monday and finished by Thursday or Friday of the same week.
On the first day of the course, the researcher reviewed the designation/experience level
pairing of each cockpit flight crew to ensure a minimum of one instructor pilot or aircraft
commander was part of each cockpit flight crew ensuring normal cockpit flight crew
representation. The number of cockpit flight crews available for the study varied from
one to four cockpit flight crews per week.
The researcher met with each Proficiency Simulator Course cockpit flight crew
member during the Emergency Procedures 1 OFT event, explaining the research study’s
objectives and distributing an IRB Informed Consent Form (Appendix H) to each pilot of
the cockpit flight crew. After each pilot signed the research study’s consent form and the
researcher answered all questions about the study, each pilot received a Shared Mental
Model Instrument. The researcher explained what the Shared Mental Model Instrument’s
purpose was and how to individually complete grid-like format by judging the relatedness
of each critical team task to another task and choosing a related value ranging from 1 (not
related) to 5 (very related). Each pilot acknowledged fully understanding how to
complete the Shared Mental Model Instrument. The researcher informed the cockpit
flight crewmembers to bring their completed Shared Mental Model Instruments to their
Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event later in the week. The cockpit flight crews were also
advised about the ITO maneuvers later that week during the Emergency Procedures 2
OFT event. At no point were the cockpit flight crews told that the coupled and manual
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ITOs were being specifically observed for mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors.
The Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event always occurred Thursday or Friday
during the week of the Proficiency Simulator Course. The researcher met with each
cockpit flight crew at the start of the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event and collected a
completed Shared Mental Model Instrument from each pilot. Prior to boarding the MH65 OFT, the ATC Mobile instructor pilot conducting the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT
event was given a job aid outlining the Latin Square design order for that particular
cockpit flight crew. Additional information on the job aid included protocol for labeling
the coupled and manual ITOs recordings by cockpit flight crew number for later viewing.
Since the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event contained other training maneuvers and
instructional items, the ATC Mobile instructor pilot was given latitude on when to
complete the coupled and manual ITOs during the OFT event. The researcher was not in
the OFT during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.
Within a week of the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event, each CRM SME
individually viewed the recorded ITO maneuvers on the debriefing station and completed
a Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument for the two coupled and two manual ITOs
performed by each cockpit flight crew. Though the four ITOs took approximately 20
minutes to complete during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event, completing of
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments while watching the four recorded ITOs took
approximately 1 to 1.5 hours for each cockpit flight crew. The playback capability of the
debriefing station allowed the CRM SMEs to observe each cockpit flight crew interaction
during the ITO maneuvers as many times as necessary to observe and judge all mutual
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performance monitoring and backup behaviors. Once both CRM SMEs had completed
observing each cockpit flight crew
crew’s coupled and manual ITOs by judging their mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors on each ITO maneuver, the researcher
collected the eight completed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments and combined
them with the two completed Shared Mental Model Instruments to form a data collection
package for each cockpit flight crew. The Proficiency Simulator Course data collection
steps, associated data instruments, and event/instrument outputs are seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Proficiency Simulator Course Data Collection S
Steps.
Data Collection Preparation
The data collection package for each cockpit flight crew consisted of two
individually completed Shared Mental Model Instruments and eight CRM SME
completed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments. Malfunctions with the MH-65
OFT prevented three of the participating cockpit flight crews from completing the
coupled
ed and manual ITOs. Therefore, complete data packages (two Shared Mental
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Model Instruments and four Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments) were available
for only 30 participating cockpit flight crews. In the following section, the researcher
describes the data collection preparation steps for the researcher-designed instruments in
preparation for data analysis.
Shared Mental Model Instrument Data
Participating MH-65 pilots completed a Shared Mental Model Instrument and
gave it to the researcher prior to their involvement in the cockpit flight crew ITO
maneuvers. The researcher calculated the shared mental model score for each cockpit
flight crew. The data set for analysis contained 30 cockpit flight crew shared mental
model scores. The Shared Mental Model Instruments also produced a pilot designation
pairing, e.g. aircraft commander / first pilot, and cockpit total flight time descriptive
statistics for each cockpit flight crew.
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Data
Each cockpit flight crew flew four ITO maneuvers (two coupled and two manual)
during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event. Each pilot flew a coupled ITO and
manual ITO and then functioned as safety pilot while the other pilot flew a coupled and
manual ITO. The cockpit flight crew total data collection package consisted of four
coupled ITO Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments (two per CRM SME observer)
and four manual ITO Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments (two per CRM SME
observer). The maximum number of points for each Monitoring/Backup Behavior
Instrument was 50 with total possible points of 200 for each cockpit flight crew’s four
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments.
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Chapter Summary
The study’s six research objectives were measured using a cross-sectional,
descriptive, nonexperimental repeated measures methodology with MH-65 pilots
attending their annual Proficiency Simulator Course. Using the MH-65 OFT located at
ATC Mobile, cockpit flight crews flew coupled and manual ITO maneuvers to study the
interaction effect of shared mental model levels, cockpit automation, and flight crew
experience level on mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors. Two
researcher-designed data collection instruments were used to determine the level of
mental model sharedness and level of monitoring and backup behaviors among the
participating cockpit flight crews. The SMEs viewed the recorded ITO maneuvers and
judged the levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of the cockpit
flight crews. The cockpit operational relevance of flight crew pairings and the
counterbalancing ITO maneuver Latin Square observation design mitigated internal and
external threats to the study. The following chapter describes the results of the study’s
data analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA
The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or
manual), and cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors. The researcher designed the Shared Mental Model Instrument and the
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument for specific data collection efforts. Each MH65 pilot participating in the study completed the Shared Mental Model Instrument, and
the data on the instrument helped determine the level of mental model sharedness
between the cockpit flight crew regarding critical tasks associated with the coupled and
manual ITO. By calculating the Shared Mental Model Instruments completed by pilots in
each cockpit flight crew, the researcher created a shared mental model score. The
researcher later compared the shared mental model score with mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors performed by each cockpit flight crew during the ITOs.
The researcher also used the Shared Mental Model Instrument to capture descriptive
statistics of each cockpit flight crew (designation/qualification, total pilot flight time).
The purpose of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was to determine the level of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between each cockpit
flight crew during the coupled and manual ITOs and to create a coupled and manual ITO
mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score for each cockpit flight crew.
The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments were completed by CRM SMEs observing
the recording of each cockpit flight crew’s ITO maneuvers and determined observed
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of the cockpit flight
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crews. The chapter presents the data analysis results for each of the six research
objectives of the study.
Demographics
The demographics of the study participants were collected on the Shared Mental
Model Instrument. Pilots self-reported designation/qualification and their total flight
time. After completing the data collection preparation steps as described in the previous
chapter, the researcher compiled the Shared Mental Model Instrument to produce a
designation/qualification pairing descriptive statistic for each cockpit flight crew. Pilot
total flight time on the Shared Mental Model Instrument was used for determining
cockpit flight crew total flight time.
Research Objective One (RO1)
The purpose of RO1 was to show descriptive statistics of the sample population
according to pilot designation/qualification (instructor pilot, aircraft commander, first
pilot, copilot) and cockpit total flight time experience. All MH-65 pilot designations
were represented in the population convenience sample (N = 30) of the cockpit flight
crews. Each cockpit flight crew contained at least one pilot with either an instructor pilot
or aircraft commander. Of the 30 cockpit flight crews, instructor pilots were part of 60%
(n = 18) of the cockpit flight crews, and aircraft commanders were part of the remaining
40% (n = 12). The cockpit flight crew pairing in the sample population represented all
normal designation pairings and experience levels normally found in Coast Guard
cockpits. Table 8 shows the study’s cockpit flight crews ranked by paired designation
from the highest combined designation and qualification level to lowest in terms of
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training, aviation experience, maturity, aviation decision making, Coast Guard
operational experience, and multipiloted aircraft CRM experience.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics of Cockpit Flight Crews

Cockpit Flight Crew by Paired Designation/Qualification
Pilot 1

Pilot 2

N

instructor pilot

instructor pilot

2

instructor pilot

aircraft commander

8

instructor pilot

first pilot

4

instructor pilot

copilot

4

aircraft commander

aircraft commander

8

aircraft commander

first pilot

3

aircraft commander

copilot

1

Total Cockpit Flight Crews

30

Of the 30 cockpit flight crews participating in the study, only five paired
designation/qualification contained copilots. The remaining 25 paired
designation/qualification cockpit flight crews comprised of instructor pilots, aircraft
commanders, or first pilots, thus representing higher levels of aircraft and Coast Guard
operational experience and pilot in command competencies. Ten cockpit flight crews
contained similar pilot designations, e.g. instructor pilot and instructor pilot, aircraft
commander and aircraft commander. These particular cockpit flight crews represented a
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cockpit flight crew designation/qualification setting in which both pilots held similar
designation, qualification, and pilot in command abilities. In a multipiloted Coast Guard
cockpit, the pilot functioning as the pilot in command normally provides leadership in the
cockpit environment and is responsible for a safe execution of the flight. During the
coupled and manual ITO maneuvers in the MH-65 OFT with cockpits containing similar
pilot designation/qualifications, the pilot flying the aircraft assumed the role of pilot in
command.
To gauge the overall experience and maturity level of the participating cockpit
flight crews, the study combined the total flight hours of each cockpit flight crew (two
pilots) to create a cockpit flight crew total flight time variable. Individual total flight time
of each pilot was self-reported on the Shared Mental Model Instrument and combined
with the other cockpit flight crewmember to establish a cockpit flight crew total flight
time. Table 9 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and SD for cockpit flight crew total
flight time.
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of Cockpit Flight Crew Total Flight Time

Variable

N

Cockpit Flight Crew 30
Total Flight Time

Min

Max

Mean

SD

2005

9100

4652

1827

One of the four instructor pilot / copilot cockpit flight crew designation pairings had a
minimum flight crew total flight time of 2005 with the instructor pilot having 1600 total
flight hours and the copilot having 405 total flight hours. The cockpit flight crew pairing
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having the maximum combined total flight hours of 9100 was a paired designation of
aircraft commander and aircraft commander. The combined cockpit flight crew total
time mean of 4652 showed normal levels of combined flight time experience for Coast
Guard multipiloted cockpits.
Since the focus of the study was the combined experience level of the cockpit
flight crew on ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors, the individual
total flight time self-reported on the Shared Mental Model Instruments was not used as a
study variable. However, the range of the individual total flight time of the pilot
participants ranged from a copilot with 405 total flight hours to a 7500 flight hour aircraft
commander. Four of the five copilots had less than 1000 hours of total flight time, a
normal amount of time for Coast Guard Air Station duty-standing pilots holding a copilot
designation.
Results
Data for the following research objectives were collected on the study’s two
researcher-designed data collection instruments. Research objective 2 shows the data
analysis of cockpit flight crews’ shared mental model scores. Research objectives 3, 4, 5,
and 6 show the relationships and interactions of the study’s three independent variables
on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
Research Objective Two (RO2)
The purpose of RO2 was to show the level of mental model sharedness between
each MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crew regarding the ITO maneuver. A shared mental
model was determined by each pilot of a cockpit flight crew scoring the relatedness of
seven critical team tasks. The Shared Mental Model Instruments of each cockpit flight
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crew were aggregated to produce a shared mental model score. A lower shared mental
model score represented a higher level of shared mental model regarding seven critical
team tasks. Complete agreement between a cockpit flight crew regarding the relatedness
of ITO maneuver critical team tasks would result in a score of zero (highest possible level
of shared mental model) while complete disagreement of ITO maneuver critical team
tasks would result in a score of 84 (lowest level possible level of shared mental model).
The minimum shared mental model score of 14 was recorded for two cockpit flight crews
with designation/qualification pairings of aircraft commander / first pilot and instructor
pilot / copilot. The highest aggregated shared mental model score of 51 occurred
between an aircraft commander / first pilot. Table 10 shows the minimum, maximum,
mean and SD for cockpit flight crew shared mental model scores.
Table 10
Shared Mental Model Score

Variable

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Score

14

51

23.43

7.74

No cockpit flight crew showed total agreement on the relatedness of the seven
critical team tasks (zero shared mental model score), but all cockpit flight crews shared
mental model scores that fell within the lower two-thirds of possible scores, indicating a
general agreement by the cockpit flight crews on the levels of relatedness of the seven
critical team tasks of the ITO maneuvers. The cockpit flight crews shared mental model
scores were associated with both high and low levels of cockpit flight crew total flight
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time indicating the existence of shared mental models at all levels of cockpit flight crew
experience and maturity.
Data Analysis of Cockpit Flight Crews Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup
Behaviors
Research objectives 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the relationships and interactions of the
study’s independent variables on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors by cockpit flight crews during the ITO maneuvers flown in the MH-65
OFT. After completing the data collection preparation steps as described in the previous
chapter, the researcher compiled the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments to produce
a coupled ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score and manual
ITO mutual performance monitoring for each cockpit flight crew. The following data
analysis shows the mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior scores by each
research objective and independent variable. An alpha of .05 was used for all statistical
tests.
Research Objective Three (RO3)
The purpose of RO3 was to show the relationship between a cockpit flight crew
ITO maneuver shared mental model score and observed levels of mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers. Since the shared mental
model score and ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior scores are
quantitative in nature, the researcher used the Pearson’s r to assess the linear relationship
between the shared mental model score independent variable and coupled and manual
ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors dependent variables (Green &
Salkind, 2011). The correlation between cockpit flight crew shared mental model score

104
and coupled ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score was not
significant, r(28) = .26, p = .160. The correlation between cockpit flight crew shared
mental model and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors
was not significant, r(28) = .14, p = .463. The results indicate that for the 30 cockpit
flight crews, there is no relationship between levels of mental model sharedness and
observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO
maneuvers. Higher levels of mental model sharedness of the relatedness of ITO
maneuver critical team tasks among cockpit flight crews may reflect in both higher levels
and lower levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors.
Research Objective Four (RO4)
The purpose of RO4 was to compare the type of instrument takeoff (coupled or
manual) on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews. The type of ITO serves as the repeated measures
design of the study which enabled both pilots of the two-pilot cockpit flight crew to be
measured in pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles during the coupled and manual ITOs.
It was important to measure mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors for
both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring during the ITO maneuver because in
multipiloted cockpits, both pilots provide mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors to each other simultaneously despite which pilot is actual flying the aircraft. A
one sample t test was conducted to compare mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors between the coupled and manual ITOs. According to Green & Salkind (2011),
30 scores provided a moderate sample size for the statistical test. With alpha level set at
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.05, the test was statistically significant, t(29) = 2.576, p < .015, M = 6.7, SD = 14.24,
indicating that for the 30 cockpit flight crews, mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors changed between coupled and manual ITOs. Cockpit flight
crewmembers show higher levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors when flying manual ITOs than coupled ITOs. Though both types of ITOs are
designed to establish an instrument climbout profile when transitioning to forward flight
following overwater hover operations, cockpit flight crews showed higher levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors when the pilot manually flew the
aircraft as opposed to using embedded aircraft systems through cockpit automation. The
cockpit flight crews monitored each other, but it is still unclear whether pilot monitoring
of cockpit automation and pilot monitoring of the other pilot is similar. The data analysis
of RO4 shows that cockpit automation may have affected the level and quality of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors between cockpit flight crews.
Research Objective Five (RO5)
The purpose of RO5 was to show the relationship between cockpit flight crew
total flight time and observed levels and mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews. Using data collected from both the
Shared Mental Model Instruments and the completed Monitoring/Backup Behavior
Instruments, a Pearson’s r tested the linear relationship between the quantitative variables
of cockpit flight crew total flight time and coupled and manual ITO mutual performance
monitoring and backup behavior scores. The statistical analysis for RO5 is similar to that
found in RO3. The correlation between cockpit flight crew total flight time and coupled
ITO mutual performance monitoring/backup behaviors was not significant, r(28) = -.065,
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p = .734, and the correlation between cockpit flight crew total flight time and manual ITO
mutual performance monitoring/backup behaviors was not significant, r(28) = .005, p =
.979. The results indicate that for the 30 cockpit flight crews, there is no relationship
between the higher levels cockpit flight total flight time and increased levels of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the coupled and manual ITO
maneuvers. Higher cockpit flight crew total flight time did not increase or decrease
observed levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors. Cockpit flight crew total flight time varied from 2005 to 9100 total flight
hours, and the coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors varied in both high and low time flight crews. The results indicate that aviation
experience and maturity level, measured in pilot flight time, is not an indicator of
potential levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
Research Objective Six (RO6)
The purpose of RO6 was to show the combined interaction effect of the ITO
maneuver shared mental model score, ITO type (coupled or manual), and flight crew total
flight time on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews. Since cockpit flight crew shared mental models,
cockpit automation, and the experience and maturity of the flight crew exist and are
possibly interconnected in Coast Guard MH-65 multipiloted cockpits, a repeated
measures ANCOVA was used to determine the combined interaction effect of the study’s
three independent variables: 1) ITO type (within-subjects nominal variable), 2) shared
mental model (SMM) score (interval variable), and 3) flight crew total flight time
(interval variable) on the dependent variable of observed mutual performance monitoring
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and backup behaviors. The repeated measures design allowed for multiple observations
of the ITO type within-subject factor. The between-subject independent variables were
the shared mental model score and flight crew total flight time of the participating cockpit
flight crews. Typically, in repeated measures analyses, the between-subject independent
variables are categorical in nature and represent groupings. Both between-subject
independent variables in the study were interval and did not fit the traditional repeated
measures model analyses. Researchers argue that categorizing quantitative variables to
conform to a particular statistical model or simplify collected data reduces the inherent
variability of the measurements and can hide true variable relationships (Seaman &
Allen, 2014; Taylor, 2011; B. Johnson, personal communication, October 21, 2014).
Therefore, instead of categorizing the interval variables to conform to an ANOVA using
repeated measures, both between-subject independent variables were measured as
covariates to determine their combined interaction effect on the dependent variable of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
The statistical assumptions normally associated with ANCOVA, such as equal
regression slopes and linear relationship between covariates and the dependent variable,
were presumed outside the study’s considerations since the ANCOVA statistical
methodology was primarily used to preserve the quantitative independent variables as
collected (Taylor, 2011). The researcher focused on the combined interaction effect and
not the control of the study’s quantitative independent variables. The assumption of
sphericity was not required since the within-subject effect contained only two levels i.e.
coupled and manual (Park, Cho, & Ki, 2009). The researcher measured the strength of
the independent relationships using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The linear
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relationships were low and not statistically significant (p > .05). However, the shared
mental model score showed a stronger relationship than flight crew total flight time to the
monitoring and backup behaviors.
The repeated measures ANCOVA includes all main effects and interaction
effects, and the results indicated no statistically significant interaction of the shared
mental model score, cockpit total flight time, and within-subjects effects of ITO type,
F (1, 26) = 1.199, p = .284. (see Tables 11 and Table 12). The entire repeated measures
ANCOVA SPSS output is included for clarification, but the research interest lay in the
combined interaction effect of the study’s three independent variables of ITO type,
shared mental model score, and cockpit total flight time found on Table 11. The results
indicate that interconnectedness and existence of cockpit flight crew shared mental
models, cockpit automation, and the experience and maturity of the cockpit flight crew
did not affect levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors of Coast Guard cockpit flight crews.
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Table 11
Analysis of Covariance Summary of Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts

Variable

Type III Sum
of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

Partial Eta
Squared

ITO Type

208.764

1

208.764

1.998

.169

.071

ITO Type*
Cockpit
Total Flight
Time

61.897

1

61.897

.592

.448

.022

ITO
Type*SMM
Score

189.157

1

189.157

1.810

.190

.065

ITO Type*
SMM
Score*
Cockpit
Total Flight
Time

125.269

1

125.269

1.199

.284

.044

Error

2717.297

26

104.511

Total

3302.384
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Table 12
Analysis of Covariance Summary of Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Variable

Type III Sum of
Squares

Intercept

1272.785

1

1262.785

5.038

.034

.162

15.550

1

15.550

.062

.805

.002

69.650

1

69.650

.278

.603

.011

.044

1

.044

.000

.990

<.001

Error

6516.961

26

250.652

Total

7864.99

Cockpit
Total
Flight
Time
Share
Mental
Model
(SMM)
Score
SMM
Score*
Cockpit
Total
Flight
Time

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

Partial Eta
Squared
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Chapter Summary
The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type, and cockpit
flight crew total flight time on ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and
backup behaviors. Cockpit flight crews flew ITOs in the MH-65 OFT as part of their
Proficiency Simulator Course at ATC Mobile. The ITOs were recorded, and later two
CRM SMEs viewed them to judge the levels of ITO maneuver mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors between the two-pilot flight crew. The results showed
no statistically significant main effects or interaction effects of shared mental model
score, ITO type, or cockpit flight time. However, the data indicated that cockpit
automation, or the lack thereof, influenced cockpit flight crews’ levels of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors when performing coupled and manual
ITOs.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The following chapter is a summary of the study’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. The researcher discusses conclusions and appropriate
recommendations based on the data analysis findings while considering the study’s
limitations. The researcher makes recommendations for future research regarding the
role of shared mental models and cockpit automation on mutual performance monitoring
and backup behaviors in aircraft cockpits.
Summary of the Study
Aircraft cockpit flight crews use CRM to increase flight safety by strengthening
teamwork performance (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009). Researchers (Flin et al., 2008;
O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007; U.S. Coast Guard, 2009b; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003)
suggest that CRM in multipiloted cockpits reduces human error, thereby increasing flight
safety. Others (Cook et al., 2004; Dekker, 2002, 2003, 2006; Reason, 2008) argue that
flight safety in mutipiloted cockpits increases not by reducing human error but by
improving teamwork performance and introducing human elements of resiliency,
flexibility, and adaptability into the inherently unsafe sociotechnical aviation system.
Resiliency, flexibility, and adaptability among cockpit flight crews represent crew
coordination and team processes and are based on the presence of cockpit flight crew
shared mental models (Grote et al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011).
Shared mental models provide the underpinning for mutual performance monitoring and
backup behavior decisions among flight crewmembers (Salas, Rosen et al., 2006; Wilson
et al., 2007).
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The study’s literature review shows recent Coast Guard aviation mishaps and the
subsequent responses by the Coast Guard for reducing accidents by changing CRM
training for cockpit flight crews. However, the Coast Guard’s approach to reducing
accidents is based on, and promotes, a cause-and-effect linear sequencing view of human
error in the cockpit. The cause-and-effect linear sequencing view of human error in the
cockpit fails to recognize the complexity of interrelated sociotechnical systems and the
role humans play in those systems.
The training of CRM for cockpit flight crews began in the 1970s and continues
today in both commercial and military aviation. Coast Guard CRM training for cockpit
flight crews began in the early 1990s and continues today, focusing on both cognitive
skills (e.g. decision making and situational awareness) and teamwork social skills (e.g.
communication and assertiveness). However, research shows that teamwork processes
for improving cockpit flight crew coordination rely on a shared cognition represented in
shared mental models. Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and Mathieu et al.
(2000) show shared mental models producing effective mutual performance monitoring
and backup behaviors between the cockpit flight crewmembers.
To examine the effect of shared mental models on cockpit flight crew
coordination, thirty MH-65 cockpit flight crews were evaluated on mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors while flying critical night overwater ITOs in the MH65 Operational Flight Trainer located at ATC Mobile. The researcher examined the
relationships and interaction effects of cockpit flight crew shared mental model, cockpit
automation, and pilot experience (measured in cockpit total flight time) on observed
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levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the coupled and
manual ITOs.
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The following findings and conclusions are from the data collected and
subsequent statistical analysis and based on a study’s research objectives. Each research
objective indicates a specific finding followed by a specific conclusion derived from the
finding. A recommendation follows each study finding and conclusion.
Coast Guard Aircraft Cockpit Flight Crews Shared Mental Models
Shared mental models are knowledge structures among team members describing
the level of similarity, convergence, agreement, consensus, commonality, compatibility,
and consistency of those knowledge structures (Mohammed et al., 2010). In highly
dynamic environments of Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits during critical night
overwater maneuvers, the shared agreement and consensus of crew mental models were
task specific to coupled and manual ITO critical tasks for completing the ITO maneuver.
Finding. Shared mental models exist between Coast Guard MH-65 cockpit flight
crews on critical team tasks associated with critical night overwater ITOs. The cockpit
flight crew mental model is scoreable representing levels of sharedness regarding the
critical team tasks of coupled and manual ITOs. Each MH-65 cockpit flight crew had a
shared mental model score level indicating a general agreement by the cockpit flight
crews on the levels of relatedness of the seven critical team tasks of the ITO maneuvers.
The cockpit flight crews shared mental model scores were seen in both high and low
levels of cockpit flight crew aviation experience and maturity.
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Conclusion. Shared mental models exist in Coast Guard cockpits and that the
level of mental model sharedness between cockpit flight crews is associated with specific
cockpit tasks. Consistent with the findings of Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005),
and Mathieu et al. (2000), cockpit flight crew mental model sharedness is a quantifiable
score that can be determined by surveying cockpit flight crews on the specific cockpit
flight crew tasks. A shared mental model among cockpit flight crews is necessary to
perform successfully critical low overwater coupled and manual ITO maneuvers in the
night environment. Standardized operating procedures and flight crew verbal
communication, i.e. pilot briefing, establishes the cockpit flight crew shared mental
model for the coupled and manual ITO maneuvers.
Recommendation. All critical flight maneuvers performed in the Coast Guard
aircraft by cockpit flight crews, e.g. instrument takeoffs and approaches, visual takeoffs
and landings, and nighttime low overwater operations, should have cockpit flight crew
standardized operating procedures and preestablished verbal communication. Coast
Guard cockpit flight crews should be continuously assessed on the ability to perform the
standardized critical flight maneuvers both as the pilot flying and as pilot monitoring.
Coast Guard Aircraft Cockpit Flight Crew Shared Mental Models and Mutual
Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors
High-performing teams use shared mental models to anticipate the needs of other
team members and provide timely, error-free exchange of information when necessary
(Entin & Serfaty, 1999). Cockpit flight crewmembers increase crew coordination and
improve flight safety by monitoring each other and providing backup when required.
According to Kontogiannis & Malakis (2009) and Potter et al. (2014), mutual
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performance monitoring and backup behaviors allow cockpit flight crewmembers to
detect mistakes made by other crewmembers and serves as the final defense in cockpit
human errors.
Finding. The study’s finding did not show statistical significance for the
relationship between the higher levels of mental model sharedness and increased levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers. The
finding indicates cockpit shared mental models can be associated with both high and low
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors. More specifically,
higher levels of mental model sharedness in the cockpit do not necessarily translate into
increased levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
Conclusion. Coast Guard cockpit flight crewmembers act and create appropriate
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors to improve crew coordination,
thus producing safer cockpit flight crews regardless of levels of mental model sharedness.
Though the purpose of the study was to determine the role of cockpit shared mental
models in the team coordination skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors, the study shows that monitoring and backing up behaviors occur among Coast
Guard cockpit flight crewmembers with both low and high levels of mental model
sharedness.
Cockpit human error is inevitable in the complex sociotechnical aviation system
which is inherently unsafe, and Coast Guard cockpit flight crews create flight safety by
monitoring and backup behaviors despite shared mental model agreement levels. The
key point here is that flight safety is not improved in Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits
by eliminating human error or increasing mental model sharedness, but flight safety is
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created when flight crews adapt, through human resiliency and flexibility, and determine
proper monitoring and backup responses for a given situation. Furthermore, Coast Guard
cockpit flight crews create flight safety by adapting and responding to changing situations
in highly complex and hazardous flight environments with appropriate mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors. Given the results of this study, it is
unclear whether shared mental models positively influence or mediate mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors when cockpit flight crews create flight
safety.
Recommendation. Coast Guard aviation leadership should accept that aircraft
accidents will continue to occur because of the inevitability of human error in the
complex sociotechnical aviation system. Because of the inevitability of human error in
Coast Guard cockpits, flight crews need to recognize they are responsible for creating
safety in the cockpit through effective team coordination CRM skills of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors. Based on the findings of this research
and related literature, this author recommends a stronger linkage between backup
behaviors and mutual performance monitoring in CRM training for Coast Guard cockpit
flight crews. Agreeing with Sumwalt et al. (2003), the researcher also recommends pilot
monitoring skills as the next focus for cockpit flight crew CRM training. The training
could be associated with flight discipline (i.e. defined crew duties, checklist use,
standardized cockpit communication) providing further illumination of cockpit flight
crew performances possibly related to mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors.
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Cockpit Automation and Cockpit Flight Crew Mutual Performance Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors
Cockpit automation can lead to poor human-monitoring performance (Casner &
Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes &
Berman, 2010). Pilot monitoring behaviors involve scanning and processing of both
aircraft automated systems and the actions of the other pilot to determine the allocation of
attention resources to areas of need (Potter et al., 2014). However, the management of
cockpit automation by cockpit flight crews can be distracting to the point that they fail to
monitor each other adequately at a time it’s needed the most (Langewiesche, 2014).
Finding. Flight crews exhibited more backup and monitoring behaviors when
performing manual ITOs than when performing coupled ITOs. Specifically, pilots
increase monitoring/backup behaviors with lower levels of cockpit automation.
Conclusion. Cockpit automation affects the nature and level of mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between cockpit flight
crewmembers during the ITO maneuvers. Higher levels of cockpit automation leads to
lower levels of mutual monitoring performance between cockpit flight crews. The
researcher concludes that highly reliable cockpit automated systems lead to lower
monitoring performance because of the perceived lower probability of error of the
aircraft’s automated system. Agreeing with Hamilton (2010), the researcher concludes
that as cockpit automation levels increase, the cockpit flight crew workload increases
attempting to understand, monitor, and control the automation. If cockpit automation
fails, the cockpit workload further increases as pilots attempt to understand the failure
and the impact of the failure.
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The U.S. Coast Guard (2013) automation pyramid conceptual framework
regarding the flight discipline of cockpit automation shows decreasing levels of workload
and increasing levels of situational awareness with higher levels of cockpit automation
(see Figure 7). The automation pyramid indicates that cockpit automation reduces
cockpit workload and shows lower pilot monitoring requirements of cockpit automation
and the other pilot. The Coast Guard’s automation pyramid also indicates that the
situational awareness of cockpit flight crews increases with higher levels of cockpit
automation.

Figure 7. Coast Guard’s Automation Pyramid depicting the relationship between
situation awareness (SA) cockpit workload with different levels of cockpit automation.
Adapted from “U.S. Coast Guard Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST 3710.1G.”
Washington, DC: Author. p. 4-5. Copyright 2013 by the U.S. Coast Guard. Adapted
with permission.
According to Endsley (2010), the benefits of cockpit automation occur when the
automated procedure plan aligns with the flight crew’s plan. However, when cockpit

120
automation misaligns with the flight crew’s plan, the flight crew becomes “outside-of-the
loop” of the automation, in turn reducing the flight crew’s situational awareness. The
researcher agrees with the situational awareness impacts to cockpit flight crews caused by
cockpit automation that Endsley sets forth.
Recommendation. Coast Guard cockpit flight crews need a better understanding
of the relationship between cockpit automation and pilot workload and the potential
impacts of cockpit automation to mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors
in the cockpit. Coast Guard policy on the use of cockpit automation should properly
reflect increases of cockpit flight crew workload and monitoring behavior requirements
with higher cockpit automation levels. Coast Guard pilots need to understand that
cockpit automation requires the same and possibly increased levels of monitoring and
backup behaviors compared to the automated system. Coast Guard CRM training should
address the requirement for increased levels of crew coordination, specifically increasing
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between the cockpit
flight crew
flight crew when using cockpit automation. Agreeing with Tesmer (2010), the researcher
recommends that cockpit flight crews be taught to treat cockpit automation as the
“dumbest crewmember of the flight crew” since the automation is unable to establish the
true nature of the cockpit flight crew intent when utilized (p. 293).
Aviation Experience on Cockpit Flight Crew Mutual Performance Monitoring and
Backup Behaviors
Team members with more experience working together request and accept more
backup from each other, and team member backup behaviors increase with teammates’
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familiarity (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009). In multipiloted cockpits, the type and level of
interaction and communication between the pilots is based on experience and maturity
level of each pilot (Prince et al., 2010).
Finding. This study’s did not show statistical significance for the relationship
between the higher levels cockpit flight crew total flight time and increased levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers. The
finding indicates aviation experience, expressed through pilot total flight time, is
associated with both high and low levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors. In other words, higher total flight time does not necessarily translate into
increased levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
Conclusion. Pilots with low aviation experience may perform monitoring and
backup behaviors as well as highly experienced pilots, and experienced pilots do not
necessarily perform higher levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors. Coast Guard cockpit flight crews of all aviation experience levels can exhibit
appropriate levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors, implying
that the team coordination CRM skills can be learned early in one’s aviation career.
Agreeing with Tullo (2010), the researcher concludes that mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors need to be trained, practiced, and evaluated.
Recommendation. Behaviors are learned through observing and modeling of
behaviors in others (Ormrod, 1995). The best way to teach mutual performance
monitoring and backup behaviors is for an instructor pilot to model the appropriate
behavior in the cockpit. Behavior role modeling is an effective tool for modeling mutual
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performance monitoring and backup behaviors for Coast Guard cockpit flight crews, and
that modeling must occur in the aircraft or OFT to be effective.
Shared Mental Model, Cockpit Automation, and Aviation Experience on Cockpit Crew
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors
Workload in the modern aircraft cockpits is divided into two groups: workload
demands from within the cockpit and workload demands from outside the cockpit
(Hamilton, 2010). In addition to normal aircraft flight cockpit workload demands, pilots
must communicate, monitor, and back up the other pilot in multipiloted aircraft cockpits.
Finding. This study demonstrates no combined interaction effects between a
cockpit flight crew shared mental model, cockpit automation, and pilot flight time on
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
Conclusion. The interactions of shared mental models and aviation experience of
cockpit flight crews, combined with cockpit automation tasks, have a minimal effect on
each other.
Limitations of the Study
According to Sprinthall (2012), statistical research is empirical, inductive, and
interpretable. The ability to infer from the study’s findings may be diminished by four
study limitations. The first limitation to the study is the sample population and size. The
population of the study is the 430 Coast Guard pilots who fly the MH-65 aircraft. These
pilots are located at Coast Guard units throughout the United States. Short of having all
430 pilots participate in the study, a random sample of study participants from the
population would have provided the strongest ability for statistical inference. The
researcher chose a convenience sample of MH-65 pilots attending their annual
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Proficiency Simulator Course to reduce time and study costs. The Proficiency Simulator
Course also allowed the use of the MH-65 Operational Flight Trainer located at ATC
Mobile for data collection purposes. The convenience sample introduced a sample error
to the study. Creating an abstract population for inferences purposes from a
nonprobability sample ultimately reduced the sampling statistical power. Data collection
from the 30 cockpit flight crews participating in the study represents 7% of the MH-65
pilot population. The 7% of the MH-65 pilot population fell short of the sample size
needed to ensure an acceptable confidence level and corresponding margin of error.
Therefore, the study findings may not reflect the shared mental models and monitoring
and backup behaviors of the entire MH-65 pilot population.
The second limitation is the study’s data collection instruments. The researcherdesigned data collection instruments were designed to explore the study’s six research
objectives. The objective of the Shared Mental Model Instrument was determining the
level of mental model sharedness between the MH-65 cockpit flight crewmembers about
the seven ITO maneuver critical team tasks and producing a shared mental model score
for each cockpit flight crew. Similar to methods found in Marks et al. (2002), Mathieu et
al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000), the data collection instrument listed critical team
tasks for both cockpit flight crewmembers. The cockpit flight crews were asked to make
judgments about the relatedness of the critical team tasks using a 5-point scale to
determine the mental model sharedness between the cockpit flight crewmembers. The
researcher calculated a shared mental model score by aggregating the combined related
values of the Shared Mental Model Instrument of each cockpit flight crew. Conversely,
Marks et al. (2002) determined the shared mental model score of a three-person Apache
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gunship flight crew by feeding critical team task values into Pathfinder computer
program and producing a similarity index. Mathieu et al.’s (2005) shared mental model
score was calculated using UCINET network analysis program thereby producing a
centrality index. The centrality index identified “network relationships underlying
mental models in a fashion similar to…Pathfinder solutions” (Mathieu et al., 2005, p. 43).
Marks et al. (2002) and Mathieu et al. (2005) used the computing power of Pathfinder’s
knowledge structure assessment and UCINET’s social network analysis for mathematical
shared mental model measurements. A limitation to this study is the shared mental
model measurement methodology of manually calculating the shared mental model score
(index) instead of using the analytic capabilities of computer software.
The two CRM SMEs observed the recorded coupled and manual ITOs and used
the researcher-designed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument to record levels of
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors among cockpit flight crews. The
instrument did not function as originally designed because many of the monitoring and
backup behavior markers statements were written based on possible mistakes and
procedural errors by the pilot flying and pilot monitoring. When mistakes and procedural
errors did not occur, the monitoring and backup behavior marker was unobservable. This
discrepancy became apparent to the researcher following university and Coast Guard IRB
approval and during cockpit flight crew data collection. Even though additional training
was held for the two CRM SMEs to mitigate the instrument discrepancy, a low Pearson’s
r interrater reliability score between the two CRM SMEs for coupled and manual scores
possibly occurred as a result of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors scoring.
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A third limitation is the statistical analysis of the data. The statistical analysis of
the three independent variables and one dependent variable was based on the desired
outcome of each research objective. Since the research objectives and data collection
design drove the statistical tests, the between-subject quantitative variables were left
intact and analyzed with a repeated measures ANCOVA. The researcher agrees that
disregarding normal ANCOVA statistical assumptions to preserve the quantitative
independent variables reduced the study’s statistical validity but found disregarding
statistical assumptions necessary when using the repeated measures design. Therefore,
the shared mental model score and cockpit total flight time were treated as independent
interval variables and not true study covariates.
The researcher's place of employment for the study’s setting was the fourth
limitation and may have influenced the study’s results. While all cockpit flight crews
asked to participate did so, the environment of the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center
and the importance of the pilots’ annual Proficiency Simulator Course may have swayed
their decision to participate. The esprit de corps of the aviation profession and team
nature of the pilot community may have duly impelled individual Coast Guard pilots to
participate. Though audio and video recordings of the Proficiency Simulator Course
instructional events are standard protocol, the recordings may have altered the interaction
of cockpit flight crew and the level monitoring and backup behaviors displayed by the
pilots. Pilots may have altered their normal verbal interaction and communication to
enhance crew coordination behaviors for the recordings.
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Recommendations for Further Research
While the results of the study provide insight into the influence of shared mental
models and cockpit automation on cockpit flight crew monitoring and backup behaviors,
the potential for further research exists. Based on the study’s findings, the following are
recommendations for future research:
1. While early attempts of CRM training focused on increasing assertiveness of
copilots and reducing dictatorial personalities of pilots in command, today’s
cockpits are highly automated, and flight crews are normally taught during initial
stages of training to work as a team. Flight disciplines such as standard operating
procedures for cockpit flight crews, defined crew duties, and the use of cockpit
checklist are embedded in today’s cockpit team processes. However, research is
necessary to clarify the role of shared mental models in team coordination CRM
skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors and their tie to
aviation flight discipline practices.
2. The critical CRM skills found in Orlady and Foushee (1987), Helmreich and
Foushee (1993), and Prince and Salas (1993) may still be applicable today, but
research is necessary to show how to translate those critical CRM skills identified
20 years ago into creating flight safety in today’s highly automated cockpits.
3. Aviation CRM training rooted in human error elimination promotes only the
cause and effect solution and is normally a result of post-accident aviation
investigations fraught with hindsight bias and a cause-consequence human error
view (Dekker, 2006). With new views on human error in inherently unsafe
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complex systems, further research is necessary to understand humans’
contribution to flight safety.
4. The safety data collection program Line Operations Safety Audit is an aviation
industry attempt to identify successful CRM skills displayed by cockpit flight
crews in the actual operational environment. A Line Operations Safety Audit
evaluates cockpit flight crew performance in normal day-to-day operations
identifying sociotechnical aviation system issues related to safety (Tesmer, 2010).
A Continental Airlines Line Operations Safety Audit showed that cockpit flight
crews with good CRM behaviors performed better in the complex sociotechnical
aviation system than those with poor CRM behaviors (Tesmer, 2010). Human
contribution to flight safety should be further explored through a similar-type
analysis. The analysis would further illuminate successful CRM mutual
performance monitoring and backup behaviors of frontline pilot professionals
operating in the complex sociotechnical aviation system.
5. Other U.S. military services should replicate the current study in other aircraft
types using full-mission OFTs. Since all military services of the United States use
state-of-the-art full-mission OFTs for all initial and recurrent pilot training, the
opportunity for replicating team coordination CRM skills research using fullmission OFTs is abundant.
Conclusion
Aviation CRM is now the most widely used strategy for team coordination
training for cockpit flight crews, and it is utilized in the Coast Guard to improve each
flight crew’s ability to work as a team. The purpose of the study was to examine the
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relationships and interaction of the ITO maneuver shared mental model, type of ITO, and
cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance monitoring and backup
behaviors. Sumwalt et al. (2003) argue that monitoring and backup skills are the next
focus of CRM training. The goal of the research is to help Coast Guard aviation
leadership find ways to improve flight safety in the Coast Guard cockpits. Because Coast
Guard flight crews must continuously operate in a sociotechnical aviation system that is
complex, imperfect, ambiguous, and often contradicting, monitoring and backup skills
must be the next focus of CRM training for Coast Guard flight crews.
For Coast Guard flight crews to operate effectively in extreme and hazardous
environments such as night overwater ITO maneuvers, crews require high levels of
coordination. However, instances of failing to monitor and backup are occurring in Coast
Guard aircraft accidents. Just telling cockpit flight crews to monitor and backup more is
not enough. A better understanding of the role of shared mental models in flight crew
team coordination CRM skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors
is necessary. Coast Guard flight crews must take advantage of the multipiloted human
redundancy of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.
A success example of cockpit crew flight discipline, shared mental model, pilot
monitoring and backup behaviors, and ultimate cockpit team effectiveness is US Airways
Flight #1549 emergency water landing in the frigid waters of the Hudson River on
January 15, 2009 (Fraher, 2011). Following a bird strike and total failure of both
engines, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles safely
glided the damaged commercial aircraft to an emergency water landing, saving all 150
passengers and five crew on board. Six months later, during the NTSB public hearing
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regarding the US Air #1549 emergency water landing, Captain Sullenberger stressed the
importance of CRM crew coordination monitoring and backup behaviors by saying, "I
think it is that paying attention matters. That having awareness constantly matters.
Continuing to build that mental model to build a team matters" (Langewiesche, 2009, p.
23). When high-risk situations happen to Coast Guard flight crews operating in the
complex sociotechnical aviation system, Coast Guard cockpit flight crews need to be
ready to react with high levels of crew coordination, similar to Captain Sullenberger and
his crew, and create flight safety with shared mental models and critical monitoring and
backup skills. Creating flight safety with monitoring and backup behaviors is the CRM
human capital performance outcome that can save the lives of the brave flight crews
operating in high-risk environments such as overwater operations at night.
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APPENDIX A
FLIGHT MISHAP CLASS COST BREAKDOWN
FISCAL YEAR 2010 and Beyond
Class A

$2,000,000 or greater or death

Class B

$500,000 to $1,999,999 or serious injury

Class C

$50,000 to $499,999 or minor injury

Class D

Less than $49,999

Class E

Engine damage only, regardless of cost
FISCAL YEAR 2002 to 2009

Class A

$1,000,000 or greater or death

Class B

$200,000 to $999,999 or serious injury

Class C

$20,000 to $199,999 or minor injury

Class D

Less than $20,000

Class E

Engine damage only, regardless of cost
FISCAL YEAR 1989 to 2001

Class A

$1,000,000 or greater or death

Class B

$200,000 to $999,999 or serious injury

Class C

$10,000 to $199,999 or minor injury

Class D

Less than $10,000

U.S. Coast Guard. (2010a). FY10 Aviation Safety Report. Retrieved from
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg1/cg113/docs/Safety_Reports/FY10AviationSafetyRpt.pdf
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APPENDIX B
SHARED MENTAL MODEL INSTRUMENT
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APPENDIX C
COMPLETED SHARED MENTAL MODEL INSTRUMENT EXAMPLE
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APPENDIX D
MONITORING/BACKUP BEHAVIOR INSTRUMENT
Mutual Performance Monitoring Behaviors
1. The cockpit flight crew observed the behaviors and actions of each other.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

2. The cockpit flight crew recognized aircraft flight control mistakes made by the PAC.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

3. The cockpit flight crew recognized safety pilot/mutual performance monitoring mistakes
made by the SP.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent



(5) To a very great extent



(5) To a very great extent

4. The SP identified lapses in PAC ITO procedural steps.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)

5. The PAC identified lapses in SP ITO procedural steps.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)

Backup Behaviors
6. The SP corrected PAC errors when necessary or when asked to do so


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

7. The PAC corrected SP errors when necessary or when asked to do so.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

8. The SP completed ITO procedural tasks when the PAC failed to do so.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

9. The PAC completed ITO procedural tasks when the SP failed to do so.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent

10. The cockpit crew recognized when the ITO was performed exceptionally well.


(1) Not at all



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5) To a very great extent
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APPENDIX E
FOUR ITO MANEUVER LATIN SQUARE DESIGN
Design 1
Left Seat Pilot

Right Seat Pilot

Coupled ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Manual ITO

Manual ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Coupled ITO
Design 2

Left Seat Pilot

Right Seat Pilot

Safety Pilot

Manual ITO

Manual ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Coupled ITO

Coupled ITO

Safety Pilot
Design 3

Left Seat Pilot

Right Seat Pilot

Manual ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Coupled ITO

Coupled ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Manual ITO
Design 4

Left Seat Pilot

Right Seat Pilot

Safety Pilot

Coupled ITO

Coupled ITO

Safety Pilot

Safety Pilot

Manual ITO

Manual ITO

Safety Pilot
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APPENDIX F
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION
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APPENDIX G
U.S. COAST GUARD INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
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APPENDIX H
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
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